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The Agency Declaratory Judgment
EMILY S. BREMER*
This Article identifies and examines an overlooked provision of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that extends to administrative 
agencies a device analogous to the declaratory judgment. This device—
the declaratory order—enables agencies to provide case-specific, 
noncoercive, legally binding advice to regulated entities and the public, 
thereby reducing regulatory uncertainty and its attendant harms. 
Recent changes in how the courts interpret the Administrative 
Procedure Act have made the declaratory order more useful and 
accessible to agencies, while simultaneously reducing the 
attractiveness of other forms of nonbinding agency guidance. This 
Article fits the declaratory order among the various policymaking forms 
available to agencies and comprehensively analyzes current, limited 
agency use of the device. It argues that agencies should accept the 
courts’ invitation to use declaratory orders more frequently and 
creatively to improve the administration of federal regulatory 
programs.
                                                                                                                     
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. Thank you to 
Glen Staszewski and participants in the First Annual Administrative Law New Scholarship 
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and members of the Administrative Conference of the United States (and especially its 
Committee on Adjudication), for insightful comments and helpful suggestions on earlier 
drafts of this Article.
This Article draws extensively from an October 2015 report that I prepared as an 
academic consultant to the Administrative Conference of the United States, which adopted 
Recommendation 2015-3, Declaratory Orders, based on the Report. See 80 Fed. Reg. 
78,161, 78,163 (Dec. 4, 2015). As part of the project, I conducted in-depth interviews with 
agency officials at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), and Surface Transportation Board (STB) (a successor to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC), which had perhaps the most robust declaratory order practice 
of any agency). Thank you to these agency officials for sharing with me their time, 
considerable expertise, and valuable feedback.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Providing clarity and certainty is an enduring challenge of administrative 
governance, particularly in the regulatory context. Faced with uncertainty about 
how an agency will regulate a project or transaction, businesses and individuals 
may be unable or unwilling to act.1 The consequences for the economy, society, 
and technological progress can be significant and harmful.2 Uncertainty can also 
make an agency’s job more difficult and expensive by reducing compliance 
rates and increasing the need for the agency to actively monitor regulated 
entities and enforce regulatory requirements.3 To address these and related 
problems, agencies routinely provide advice about how they will interpret and 
apply statutes and regulations.4
Selecting the best policymaking tool for agency advice giving is a 
deceptively challenging task. An agency generally has broad discretion to 
choose among the tools that Congress has given it, and each such tool has its 
                                                                                                                     
1 Andrew B. Whitford, The Reduction of Regulatory Uncertainty: Evidence from 
Transfer Pricing Policy, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 269, 269–70, 273–74 (2010).
2 See id. at 272.
3 Sean Croston, Recent Development, The Petition Is Mightier than the Sword: 
Rediscovering an Old Weapon in the Battle over “Regulation Through Guidance,” 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 381, 383–84 (2011).
4 See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167–68 (7th Cir. 1996); Nat’l
Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 
Croston, supra note 3, at 382–84; cf. Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2010) (examining the benefits and limitations of preventive adjudication 
in the courts).
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own advantages and disadvantages.5 A legislative rule may provide the most 
reliable information about regulatory requirements to the greatest number of 
affected entities because it is generally applicable and has the “force and effect 
of law.”6 The rulemaking process, however, is frequently described as 
“ossified” and can be too expensive and time consuming for an agency to 
undertake.7 Investing agency resources in rulemaking may be particularly 
inappropriate if the agency seeks to address a narrow issue or to provide clarity 
regarding the interpretation or application of an existing regulation.8
Adjudication may offer a better procedural vehicle for providing fact-specific 
or targeted advice, but it too may require a significant investment of agency 
resources, which may not be worthwhile if the agency needs only to clarify a 
legal interpretation or policy matter.9
The most obvious alternative form of agency advice giving is the 
nonlegislative rule, which is often referred to as “informal guidance” and may 
include a wide variety of agency materials.10 Guidance is generally easy and 
inexpensive to produce, as it is unencumbered by the Administrative Procedure 
                                                                                                                     
5 See generally Yehonatan Givati, Game Theory and the Structure of Administrative 
Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 481 (2014) (offering a game theoretic account of how administrative 
agencies should choose among the different policymaking forms available to them); M. 
Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004) 
(exploring the various policymaking forms available to agencies and how courts indirectly 
review agency choices among those forms). 
6 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295–96 (1979). Defining “legal force” is 
more difficult than it appears. Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND.
L. REV. 465, 475 (2013). This is one reason why the courts have struggled to articulate a 
clear and definite test for distinguishing between legislative and nonlegislative rules. See 
infra note 13 and accompanying text.
7 Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 8–10 (1997); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Response,
Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1493 (2012). But see Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, 
Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume 
and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1419–22 (2012) (arguing that there is 
relatively weak empirical evidence to suggest that ossification is a real or pervasive 
problem). I speak here of the “informal” or “notice-and-comment” rulemaking process, as 
“formal,” on-the-record rulemaking is nearly extinct. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, 
Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 35), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808848 [https://perma.cc/Y4H4-TG7V]. 
8 The rulemaking process is not thought to be ossified for the “vast majority” of rules, 
which “are not particularly controversial or that do not have major economic consequences.”
Pierce, supra note 7, at 1497. Even for such matters, however, the costs of the process may 
exceed the benefits of providing guidance. Rulemaking is also unnecessary when an agency 
does not wish to repeal or change an existing regulation, but only to give advice as to its 
meaning or application. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012).
9 Bray, supra note 4, at 1276; Yackee & Yackee, supra note 7, at 1471–72.
10 Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance 
Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 788 (2010). 
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Act’s (APA) procedural requirements and can be made readily available to the 
public online.11 But guidance has no legal effect: an agency cannot enforce it 
against regulated parties, and a regulated party cannot use it to shield itself from 
an enforcement action if the agency later changes its view.12 Courts, concerned 
that agencies are routinely evading rulemaking requirements by issuing 
guidance, have in recent decades shown a greater willingness to scrutinize an 
agency’s classification and use of guidance.13 In these cases, agencies are much 
less likely to receive Chevron deference or enjoy a substantial likelihood of 
prevailing, as they do on judicial review of a notice-and-comment rulemaking 
or formal adjudication.14
When it enacted the APA in 1946, Congress included a provision designed 
to address these various difficulties. In § 5(d), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 554(e), it 
provided that an “agency, with like effect as in the case of other orders, and in 
its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or 
remove uncertainty.”15 A declaratory order may be issued in response to a
petition filed with the agency or on the agency’s own motion.16 It is well tailored 
to provide just the level of certainty required to overcome the deficiency of more 
informal kinds of guidance.17 This is because it is noncoercive and yet legally 
binds the agency and the named party, but only on the facts assumed in the order, 
and the agency remains free to change its position with adequate explanation in 
a subsequent proceeding.18 In short, it has some legal effect. The declaratory 
order is a device that affords substantial administrative discretion—the agency 
may decline a request to institute a declaratory proceeding or to issue a particular 
declaratory order.19 An agency’s decision, be it a denial of a petition or the 
                                                                                                                     
11 See Croston, supra note 3, at 383–84.
12 Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance 
Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 354 (2011).
13 See Appalachian Power Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 
2000); Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN.
L. REV. 565, 575 (2012); David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the 
Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 294–96 (2010); Stephen M. Johnson, In Defense
of the Short Cut, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 495, 495–96 (2012).
14 See Barnett & Walker, supra note 7, at 33–42.
15 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2012). See generally ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN.
PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 
30–34 (1941) [hereinafter AG’S REPORT] (urging Congress to include the declaratory orders 
provision in the APA).
16 Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Blake D. Morant, A Reexamination of Federal Agency Use of 
Declaratory Orders, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (2004).
17 Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2015–3, Declaratory Orders, 80 
Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,163 (Dec. 4, 2015).
18 Courts have occasionally misapprehended the nature of the declaratory order and 
characterized it as a form of informal guidance. See, e.g., Exelon Wind 1, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 
766 F.3d 380, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2014) (stating, without any citation to or acknowledgement 
of 5 U.S.C. § 554(e), that “[w]hile this FERC-issued document is rather impressively called 
a Declaratory Order, it is actually akin to an informal guidance letter”).
19 Lubbers & Morant, supra note 16, at 1102, 1117.
2017] THE AGENCY DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 1173
issuance of a declaratory order, is judicially reviewable.20 But the scope of 
review is limited, and the position an agency takes in a declaratory order is 
typically afforded deference, both on judicial review and when relevant to 
matters at issue in subsequent or parallel litigation.21
Among the many policymaking forms available to federal agencies, the 
declaratory order has been largely overlooked. Despite its apparent usefulness, 
agencies have demonstrated a persistent reluctance to use it.22 A variety of 
explanations have been offered to explain this reluctance, but two bear special 
mention. First, for many decades, the prevailing view was that the placement of 
the APA’s declaratory orders provision within § 5, governing formal 
adjudication, limited the device to that context.23 Under this view, an agency 
could not issue a declaratory order through informal adjudication or use such an 
order to address a matter not subject by statute to adjudication under the APA.24
This considerably limited the availability of the device. Second, agencies have 
expressed a strong disinclination to legally bind themselves, preferring to offer 
advice through informal, nonbinding guidance that was generally immune from 
judicial review.25 Over the years, scholars and other experts offered solutions to 
these and other sources of agency reticence and consistently urged that the use 
of declaratory orders should be expanded.26 Their efforts have been largely 
unsuccessful. 
This Article places the declaratory order among the better known 
policymaking forms available to agencies, evaluates the current status of 
declaratory practice in administration, and urges that the practice should be 
expanded.27 In doing so, this Article draws upon research I conducted as a 
                                                                                                                     
20 Id. at 1102.
21 Id. at 1119.
22 Id. at 1104.
23 AG’S REPORT, supra note 15, at 31.
24 TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 59 (1947) [hereinafter AG’S MANUAL], http://archive.
law.fsu.edu/library/admin/attorneygeneralsmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8PS-BNUH].
25 See Burnele V. Powell, Sinners, Supplicants, and Samaritans: Agency Advice Giving 
in Relation to Section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 N.C. L. REV. 339, 353 
(1985) [hereinafter Powell, Sinners].
26 See generally Lubbers & Morant, supra note 16.
27 Although the Administrative Conference studied declaratory orders in the early 
1980s, it has not previously adopted any recommendation on the subject. The Conference’s
consultant on the previous project, Professor Burnele V. Powell (then of the University of 
North Carolina School of Law), published several articles based on his study. See Burnele 
V. Powell, Administratively Declaring Order: Some Practical Applications of the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s Declaratory Order Process, 64 N.C. L. REV. 277 (1986) 
[hereinafter Powell, Administratively Declaring Order]; Burnele V. Powell, Regular 
Appellate Review, Direct Judicial Review, and the Role of Review of the Declaratory Order: 
Three Roads to Judicial Review, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 451 (1988) [hereinafter Powell, Three 
Roads]; Powell, Sinners, supra note 25. The Conference’s most recent relevant work is 
Recommendation 2014-6, Petitions for Rulemaking. See Admin. Conference of the U.S.,
Recommendation 2014-6, Petitions for Rulemaking, 79 Fed. Reg. 75,114, 75,117 (Dec. 5,
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consultant to the Administrative Conference of the United States.28 On the basis 
of this research, the Conference adopted Recommendation 2015-3, Declaratory 
Orders, urging agencies to use declaratory orders more frequently and 
creatively.29 Two fairly recent developments may improve the likelihood that 
this project can succeed where others have failed. First, over the last two 
decades, the courts have clearly held that a declaratory order may be properly 
issued through informal adjudication.30 This shift removes the most significant 
legal hurdle to expanded agency use of declaratory orders. Second, as previously 
mentioned, the courts have developed a greater willingness to review agency 
guidance and to scrutinize an agency’s characterization of a document as 
nonbinding.31 This judicial trend may reduce for agencies the comparative 
appeal of informal, nonbinding guidance. Beyond these developments, there 
may be new opportunities for agencies to use declaratory orders in creative ways 
to address modern needs. For example, agencies that adjudicate a large volume 
of similar claims and face substantial backlogs may be able to use declaratory 
orders to streamline their processes.32
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II analyzes the declaratory order’s
essential attributes, argues that the device may be used in informal adjudication, 
and examines the history of agency use (and nonuse) of declaratory orders. Part 
III explores legal issues that arise in connection with judicial review of 
declaratory orders. These issues shed further light on the nature of the device 
and may also bear on its usefulness to administrative agencies. Part IV catalogs 
the proper uses of declaratory orders, considers analogous forms of agency 
advice giving, and argues that agencies should use declaratory orders more 
frequently and creatively to improve agency policymaking and the 
administration of federal regulatory statutes. 
                                                                                                                     
2014); see also JASON A. SCHWARTZ & RICHARD L. REVESZ, PETITIONS FOR RULEMAKING:
FINAL REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (Nov. 2014), 
https://www.acus.gov/report/petitions-rulemaking-final-report [https://perma.cc/8QF9-QBPC].
28 See generally EMILY S. BREMER, DECLARATORY ORDERS: FINAL REPORT TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (Oct. 2015). 
29 See Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2015–3, Declaratory Orders,
80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,163 (Dec. 4, 2015).
30 Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 626 (1973).
31 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
32 The use of aggregate procedures can help to promote due process, increase 
uniformity, and ensure the presentation of diversified interests in an administrative 
declaratory proceeding. See MICHAEL SANT’AMBROGIO & ADAM ZIMMERMAN, AGGREGATE 
AGENCY ADJUDICATION: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE 10, 61, 76 
(June 2016), https://www.acus.gov/report/aggregate-agency-adjudication-final-report 
[https://perma.cc/3R6V-GDVW]. 
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II. UNDERSTANDING DECLARATORY ORDERS
A. Agency Choice of Policymaking Form
Agencies have a variety of policymaking forms to choose from to fulfill 
their statutory mandates. The two most prominent policymaking forms are 
legislative rulemaking and adjudication. A valid legislative rule legally binds 
regulated parties in the same manner as a statute.33 Through a nonlegislative 
rule or guidance document, an agency can offer its views to regulated parties 
about how an existing legal requirement will be interpreted or applied.34 Such 
documents may have significant influence on conduct in the regulated industry, 
but they are not legally binding.35 In adjudication, an agency typically brings an 
administrative enforcement action against an individual whom the agency 
believes has violated the law.36 The resulting order binds the party or parties 
named and may also have precedential effect for others.37 A different but related 
approach, with much the same end result, is for an agency to bring a judicial 
enforcement action in the federal courts.38 Finally, licensing and permitting are 
processes through which an agency grants a regulated party permission to 
undertake some project or action.39
As this brief summary suggests, each of the policymaking forms available 
to federal agencies has unique characteristics and offers distinct advantages and 
disadvantages. Scholars have identified five characteristics that can be used to 
describe and differentiate each policymaking form: (1) the procedure the agency 
follows; (2) the legal effect of the product that emerges from that process; (3) 
the availability and extent (i.e., scope) of judicial review of the agency’s action; 
(4) the timing of the agency’s action (i.e., before or after the targeted conduct 
has occurred) and who chooses that timing; and (5) whether the agency’s policy 
is broad or narrowly tailored to the specific characteristics and circumstances of 
individual regulated parties.40
In considering the issue of agency choice of policymaking forms, courts and 
commentators have predominately focused on the choice between legislative 
                                                                                                                     
33 Franklin, supra note 13, at 286.
34 The APA speaks of “interpretative rules” and “general statements of policy.” See 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012). Such documents have also been referred to as “advanced 
rulings.” Givati, supra note 5, at 482; see also infra note 57 (explaining further that 
“advanced rulings” appear to include guidance documents and not declaratory orders).
35 Franklin, supra note 13, at 286.
36 See Magill, supra note 5, at 1384. “Typically” because this standard description 
leaves out declaratory orders, which are a product of adjudication that have different and 
unique characteristics. See infra Part II.B.
37 Magill, supra note 5, at 1394.
38 Although some agencies have authority to litigate in federal court, most agencies 
must rely on the Department of Justice to represent them in such actions. Id. at 1393.
39 Givati, supra note 5, at 502.
40 See id. at 486; see also Magill, supra note 5, at 1390.
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rulemaking and adjudication.41 The key cases, including the Supreme Court’s
seminal decision in Chenery II, address this foundational choice.42 Scholarly 
treatment of the issue was, until recently, similarly so focused.43
In this traditional account, legislative rulemaking and adjudication are the 
two primary and mutually exclusive approaches agencies can use to develop 
policy that has the force and effect of law.44 And each of these policymaking 
forms serves distinct purposes. A legislative rule is created through an agency-
initiated notice-and-comment process that allows a wide range of interested 
persons to share their views with the agency.45 The resulting rule is prospective, 
legally binding, and broadly applicable to all regulated parties.46 Affected 
parties ordinarily can obtain pre-enforcement judicial review of the rule and, 
when a challenge is brought, the courts generally grant Chevron deference to 
the agency’s statutory interpretation and policy choice.47 In contrast, an order is 
created through an adjudicatory process that allows the named party or parties 
substantial opportunity to present detailed information to the agency, while the 
participation of other interested or similarly situated parties is limited by rules 
of intervention.48 The resulting order addresses conduct that has already 
occurred and legally binds only the named party or parties, although it may also 
have some precedential value for other regulated parties.49 The named party or 
parties generally may appeal the order, although a court’s review of the agency’s
decision is generally deferential.50
                                                                                                                     
41 See, e.g., Givati, supra note 5, at 483 (“The administrative law literature has devoted 
much attention to the choice between rule making and adjudication.”).
42 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947). 
This case is known as Chenery II because it was the second opinion issued by the Supreme 
Court in the same dispute. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 
U.S. 80, 94 (1943); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 269 (1974); Morton 
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765 (1969); 
Ford Motor Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 673 F.2d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir. 1981); Patel v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 638 F.2d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 1980).
43 See Magill, supra note 5, at 1403 n.69 (describing the “important, if now dated, 
literature focusing on agency choices between adjudication and rulemaking”). In a 2004 
article, Professor Magill expanded the scholarly discussion to include judicial enforcement 
actions and guidance documents, and in a 2014 article, Professor Givati furthered the 
discussion to include licensing, which he characterizes as a form of guidance that regulated 
parties are required to seek and obtain from an agency. Givati, supra note 5, at 483; Magill, 
supra note 5, at 1384.
44 See Magill, supra note 5, at 1398–99.
45 Interested persons may request that an agency initiate a rulemaking by filing a 
petition for rulemaking, but agencies generally have broad discretion as to whether to grant 
such requests. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012); see also SCHWARTZ & REVESZ, supra note 27,
at 11.
46 Franklin, supra note 13, at 278.
47 Magill, supra note 5, at 1395.
48 Franklin, supra note 13, at 305, 316–17.
49 Magill, supra note 5, at 1394, 1412.
50 See Powell, Three Roads, supra note 27, at 472–73.
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If an agency wishes to develop policy that does not have the force and effect 
of law, it may use guidance. Guidance may be created through any process of 
the agency’s own design.51 This process may entail deliberation wholly internal 
to the agency, a notice-and-comment process, or anything in between.52 The 
process may be agency-initiated or initiated in response to a request from a 
regulated party.53 The resulting document is generally prospective, addressing 
conduct that has not yet occurred.54 In terms of breadth, it may be broadly 
applicable to all regulated entities or narrowly tailored to the circumstances of 
an individual person or entity.55 Guidance thus offers agencies wide discretion 
along multiple dimensions. The cost of this flexibility, however, is that the 
resulting document is not legally binding.56
The table below summarizes the characteristics of these three policymaking 
forms—legislative rulemaking, adjudication, and guidance—to allow easy 
comparison. 
Table 1: Characteristics of Agency Policymaking Forms
Policymaking 
Form
Process Legal 
Effect
Judicial 
Review
Timing Breadth
Legislative 
Rulemaking
Notice and 
Comment Binding
Reviewable; 
Deferential
Ex Ante; 
Generally 
Agency 
Initiated
Broad
Adjudication
Formal or 
Informal; 
Typically 
More 
Closed
Binding Reviewable; Deferential
Ex Post; 
Generally 
Agency 
Initiated
Narrow
Guidance Any Nonbinding
Sometimes 
Reviewable; 
Less 
Deferential
Ex Ante; 
Agency 
Initiated or
on
Request
Broad or 
Narrow
In the discussion of policymaking forms, declaratory orders have escaped 
notice.57 As the next section explains, a declaratory order is a product of 
                                                                                                                     
51 Franklin, supra note 13, at 284–86, 285 n.41.
52 See id. at 285 n.41. 
53 Lubbers & Morant, supra note 16, at 1102.
54 Franklin, supra note 13, at 286.
55 Magill, supra note 5, at 1391–92.
56 Franklin, supra note 13, at 278.
57 Yehonatan Givati discusses “advanced rulings” as one of the key policymaking tools 
available to agencies, but he does not cite 5 U.S.C. § 554(e), and all of the examples he 
provides appear to be what are more commonly referred to as forms of “guidance.” See
Givati, supra note 5, at 495, 502–08, 511–12. The various forms of guidance the IRS 
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adjudication.58 But analysis of the five characteristics discussed above reveals
it to be a unique hybrid of rulemaking, adjudication, and guidance. 
B. The Declaratory Order: A Hybrid Policymaking Form
Section 5(d) of the APA, which is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 554(e), provides 
that an “agency, with like effect as in the case of other orders, and in its sound 
discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove 
uncertainty.”59 Enacted in 1946 and inspired by the then-recent development of 
state and federal courts being authorized to grant declaratory judgments,60
§ 5(d) was intended to extend to administrative agencies an analogous method 
for issuing binding rulings capable of providing clear and certain guidance to 
regulated parties without requiring those parties to first act on peril of sanction.61
As with many other aspects of administrative procedure, agency use of 
declaratory orders predated the APA.62 But the practice was not widespread.63
Congress had authorized only a few agencies to issue declaratory rulings, and 
the prevailing view was that, in the absence of specific statutory authorization, 
an agency was “powerless to render a binding declaratory ruling.”64 The 
inclusion of § 5(d) addressed this difficulty by providing a blanket authorization 
                                                                                                                     
provides to taxpayers, including letter rulings, are key among the examples he provides. See 
id. at 485, 511 n.61. In Part III.B., I analyze these vehicles as analogous to, but distinct from, 
declaratory orders.
58 Although adjudication figures prominently in the cases and commentary on agency 
choice of forum, declaratory orders appear never to have been mentioned.
59 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2012).
60 See, e.g., AG’S REPORT, supra note 15, at 30 (discussing judicial declaratory 
judgments and stating that “[t]he time is ripe for introducing into administration itself an 
instrument similarly devised, to achieve similar results in the administrative field”); cf. John 
R. Reilly, Declaratory Orders Under the APA—The Need for Legislation, 52 IOWA L. REV.
657, 658 (1967) (describing the declaratory order as “the administrative counterpart of the 
declaratory judgment”).
61 See, e.g., AG’S REPORT, supra note 15, at 6 (explaining that “in order to impart 
certainty to the administrative process, and to aid individual citizens seeking an authoritative 
statement of their rights and duties, the bill [that became the APA] proposes to authorize 
agencies to issue binding declaratory rulings”).
62 See, e.g., Bernard B. Goldner, Declaratory Actions, 2 CATH. U. AM. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1952) (“Since 1938, the Bureau of Internal Revenue has been empowered to consummate 
‘closing agreements,’ a form of declaratory order, and other federal agencies have operated 
under statutes granting them power to issue advisory opinions and declaratory rulings.”).
63 See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Powers of Supervising, Prosecuting, 
Advising, Declaring, and Informally Adjudicating, 63 HARV. L. REV. 193, 228 (1949) 
(“Federal agencies rarely issued declaratory orders before the APA was enacted, and then 
only pursuant to special statutory provisions.”).
64 AG’S REPORT, supra note 15, at 31; see also Herman Oliphant, Declaratory Rulings,
24 A.B.A. J. 7, 8 (1938) (discussing the Treasury’s efforts to secure congressional approval 
to issue binding declarations to resolve uncertainty in taxation). But see Davis, supra note 
63, at 228–29 (explaining a few qualifications necessary to the AG’s assertion that agencies 
are generally powerless to issue declaratory orders). 
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for adjudicating agencies to issue declaratory orders. In addition to the APA’s
cross-cutting authorization, Congress has occasionally granted to individual 
agencies more targeted statutory authority to issue declaratory orders, often to 
serve specified purposes.65 In addition, courts have found support for the 
issuance of declaratory orders in statutes that confer broader authorities, such as 
that to direct “other appropriate relief.”66
Declaratory orders (sometimes also called “declaratory rulings”)67 serve an 
important advice-giving function. This is evident in the APA’s text, which 
describes declaratory orders as agency decisions that “terminate a controversy 
or remove uncertainty.”68 Courts have found these twin statutory purposes 
essential to the definition of a valid declaratory order and have held (albeit in 
relatively rare instances) that an agency’s decision is not properly characterized 
as a “declaratory order” if it does not serve at least one of these purposes.69 An 
agency decision serves the first statutory purpose if it resolves “an actual 
controversy between” two parties.70 More commonly, and as will be discussed 
in greater detail in Part IV, agencies use declaratory orders to resolve various 
kinds of uncertainty regarding the application of existing statutes or regulations 
to new or different factual circumstances.71 This is in accord with the 
                                                                                                                     
65 See, e.g., Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. U.S. Fed. Power Comm’n, 421 F.2d 17, 20 (6th 
Cir. 1970) (noting that the Federal Power “Commission has statutory authority to issue 
declaratory orders,” citing both 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) and 15 U.S.C. § 717(o)). See generally 
Roger W. Kapp & Robert N. Hart, A Case Against Administrative Restraint: Declaratory 
Status Orders Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1976) 
(examining the SEC’s authority and responsibility to issue declaratory status orders under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940).
66 See Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 703 F.2d 447, 452 (10th Cir. 1983) 
(quoting 30 U.S.C. § 815(d)).
67 See, e.g., FCC Practice and Procedure, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2016); see also Powell, 
Sinners, supra note 25, at 365 n.112 (“The ‘ruling’ designation . . . is longstanding with the 
FCC.”).
68 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2012); see, e.g., British Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. Civil 
Aeronautics Bd., 584 F.2d 982, 993 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“A declaratory order is any order 
issued by an agency or staff member at a sufficiently high level, that has sufficient formality, 
that does not coerce, and that has sufficient binding effect to be judicially reviewable.”); 
Goldner, supra note 62, at 1 (“The declaratory ruling or order is the device whereby 
administrative agencies make decisions in advance of affirmative action so that rights and 
duties are declared, and affected persons can regulate their conduct and actions 
accordingly.”).
69 See, e.g., Hollister Ranch Owners’ Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 759 
F.2d 898, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
70 See W. Coast Truck Lines v. Am. Indus., Inc., 893 F.2d 229, 233 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Where the parties have come before the agency with a question that is at issue in state or 
federal litigation, the agency’s decision may “resolve controversy” within the meaning of 
§ 554(e) even if it is not outcome determinative before the courts. See City of Chi. v. FCC, 
199 F.3d 424, 428–29 (7th Cir. 1999).
71 See, e.g., British Caledonian Airways, 584 F.2d at 989 (“That some tariffs did not 
contain information on cancellation charges while others did, points to exactly that sort of 
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expectations of the APA’s supporters, as the Attorney General’s final report to 
Congress explains:
The perils of unanticipated sanctions and liabilities . . . should be reduced or 
eliminated. A major step in that direction would be the establishment of 
procedures by which an individual who proposed to pursue a course which 
might involve him in dispute with an administrative agency, might obtain from 
that agency, in the latter’s discretion, a binding declaration concerning the
consequences of the proposed action.72
In keeping with these intentions, agencies have used declaratory orders to 
clarify the regulatory status of proposed projects so as to facilitate the necessary 
(and often significant) financial investment to launch them,73 to put regulated 
parties on notice that certain conduct will henceforth trigger sanctions or other 
enforcement action,74 or to clarify the boundary between state and federal 
regulation.75 As these varied purposes perhaps suggest, it is often difficult to 
draw a clear distinction between declaratory orders that remove uncertainty and 
those that terminate controversy. In many instances, the act of removing 
uncertainty necessarily terminates or prevents controversy.76
The declaratory order is therefore best understood as a hybrid policymaking 
form that complements more familiar legislative or informal approaches to 
agency advice giving (e.g., interpretative rules, policy statements, advisory 
opinions, and other forms of nonbinding agency guidance).77 The advisory 
opinion—an informal, nonbinding form of agency guidance typically offered to 
help regulated parties understand how regulations will apply to them before they 
act—traditionally has been viewed as the immediate alternative to the 
declaratory order.78 Advisory opinions are typically provided by agency staff, 
often orally (e.g., by phone), with little formality or delay.79 More often than 
not, these opinions meet the immediate needs of both agencies and regulated 
parties, furnishing reliable guidance with little burden imposed upon the 
                                                                                                                     
‘uncertainty’ in the interpretation of the law, by those subject to it, which declaratory orders 
are explicitly authorized to remove under the terms of 5 U.S.C. § 554(e).”).
72 AG’S REPORT, supra note 15, at 30–31.
73 Primary Power, LLC, 131 FERC ¶ 61,015, at 10 (2010), https://www.ferc.gov/
CalendarFiles/20100413190631-ER10-253-000.pdf [https://perma.cc/BV5C-T6YT].
74 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732–35 (1978).
75 State Corp. Comm’n v. FCC, 787 F.2d 1421, 1428 (10th Cir. 1986).
76 See id.
77 See, e.g., Interpretative Order Modifying No-Action Letter Process and Reviewing 
Other Mechanisms for Obtaining Guidance, 123 FERC ¶ 61,157, at 8–9 (2008) (No. PL08-
2-000), http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2008/051508/M-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5DTB-GSJ5] (explaining how declaratory orders fit among the various 
mechanisms available for obtaining guidance from the Commission and its staff).
78 See AG’S REPORT, supra note 15, at 31.
79 See, e.g., Interpretative Order on Guidance, supra note 77, at 10–13, 15 (describing 
various informal mechanisms available for obtaining nonbinding guidance). 
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agency.80 The disadvantage of advisory opinions is that it they generally do not 
bind the agency.81 As a result, although advisory opinions can do much to 
resolve regulatory uncertainty, they cannot wholly or reliably eliminate it.82
In contrast to advisory opinions, the advantage and key characteristic of the 
declaratory order is that it has binding legal effect. This is grounded in the
APA’s text, which provides that an agency may issue a declaratory order “with 
like effect as in the case of other orders.”83 The binding effect of a declaratory 
order is what allows it to offer the full measure of regulatory certainty that other 
forms of agency guidance cannot provide.84
The binding effect of a declaratory order is naturally limited by the nature 
of the device. First, because declaratory orders “are only as effective as other 
adjudicatory orders, they are not binding upon nonparties.”85 Only the agency 
                                                                                                                     
80 See Note, Administrative Declaratory Orders, 13 STAN. L. REV. 307, 310 (1961).
81 E.g., FERC Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.1901(g)(6) (2017)
(providing that FERC’s General Counsel may provide written interpretations of the Natural 
Gas Policy Act or rules issued by the Commission thereunder, but, “[t]he interpretation of 
the General Counsel is not the interpretation of the Commission” and “is given without 
prejudice to the Commission’s authority to consider the same or like question and to issue a 
declaratory order to take other action which has the effect of rescinding, revoking, or 
modifying the interpretation of the General Counsel”); FERC Information and Requests, 18 
C.F.R. § 388.104 (governing informal advice from Commission staff); see also AG’S
REPORT, supra note 15, at 31 (“Advisory rulings are not an entirely satisfactory device, 
however, because they invariably carry an explicit or implicit warning that the agency is not 
bound by the opinion it has rendered.”); Oliphant, supra note 64, at 8 (discussing the 
unfortunate fallout of an IRS decision not to adhere to the advisory opinion provided to a 
taxpayer in advance of a financial transaction). But see 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(4)(A) 
(2012) (providing that, in the context of a federal antikickback statute, “[e]ach advisory 
opinion issued by the Secretary [of the Department of Health and Human Services] shall be 
binding as to the Secretary and the party or parties requesting the opinion”).
82 E.g., AG’S REPORT, supra note 15, at 31 (explaining that, because they are not 
binding, “advisory rulings do not entirely eliminate, though they materially reduce, the 
element of uncertainty”).
83 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2012); Bernard Schwartz, The Administrative Procedure Act in 
Operation, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1212–13 (1954). The APA defines “order” as “the 
whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory 
in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 551(6). The APA’s definition of an “adjudication” as an “agency process for the 
formulation of an order” is therefore a catchall category for nonrulemaking actions, including 
declaratory orders. Id. § 551(7). Finally, the APA describes “final opinions, including 
concurring and dissenting opinions,” along with “orders,” as products of adjudication. Id.
§ 552(a)(2)(A).
84 See, e.g., AG’S REPORT, supra note 15, at 31 (“Greater certainty [beyond that 
provided by advisory rulings] can be achieved only by attaching to the ruling the same 
binding effect upon the agency that is attributed to other adjudications.”). But see Exelon 
Wind 1, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380, 391 (5th Cir. 2014) (mischaracterizing a declaratory 
order as merely informal guidance).
85 New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 565 F. Supp. 949, 959 n.15 (D. 
Me. 1983) (internal citation omitted). 
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and the named party (or parties) are bound by the action.86 While the named 
party is often an individual regulated person or entity who petitioned for the 
declaration, an agency may also issue an order that applies to all similarly 
situated regulated parties, provided that such breadth is reasonable within the 
context of the agency’s statutory authority and the nature of the controversy or 
other issue the order is designed to address.87 Second, whether directed towards 
one or more regulated parties, a declaratory order’s binding effect is 
noncoercive.88 That is, it provides a declaration that is legally binding without 
itself imposing a penalty, sanction, or other liability. The noncoercive character 
of the declaratory order is essential—without it, the device would not operate 
effectively as a voluntary mechanism through which regulated parties may seek 
and obtain a binding declaration of the law without first acting in peril of 
sanction.89 A third important limitation is that a declaratory order is binding 
                                                                                                                     
86 But see Frederick F. Blachly & Miriam E. Oatman, The Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act, 34 GEO. L.J. 407, 418 (1946) (“The determination made for one individual 
would in reality be a general determination, since the declaratory order is to have ‘like effect 
as in the case of other orders,’ that is, the force of law.”).
87 See, e.g., Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 5 F.3d 
911, 916 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding an ICC declaratory order that “applies to all shippers 
who can demonstrate that their shipping patterns match the general patterns assumed in the 
order”). If an agency is contemplating the issuance of a broadly applicable declaratory order, 
it may need to take steps to ensure that all interested parties have an opportunity to comment 
or otherwise participate in the proceedings. This can be accomplished through basic notice-
and-comment procedures. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 242–43 (5th Cir. 
2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
88 See, e.g., Robert John Hickey, Declaratory Orders and the National Labor Relations 
Board, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 89, 89 (1969) (defining a declaratory order as “a noncoercive, 
definite, binding, and reviewable adjudication declaring actual, present, substantive rights of 
adverse parties on a question of law”); Note, supra note 80, at 307 (explaining that 
declaratory orders “are noncoercive declarations of rights rather than orders imposing 
penalties or liabilities” (citing 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 4.10, at 268 (1958))). See generally 5 U.S.C. § 551(10) (defining “sanction”). As Professor 
Davis explained: “The only difference between declaratory orders or judgments and other 
orders and judgments is presence or absence of the element of coercion.” DAVIS, supra,
§ 4.10, at 268.
89 See Walter Gellhorn, Declaratory Rulings by Federal Agencies, 221 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 153, 155 (1942). An agency may, of course, issue a coercive order 
in a later proceeding on the authority of the previously issued declaratory order. This may 
occur if the party to the declaratory order is later found in noncompliance without having 
successfully challenged the declaration on appeal. Or the agency may rely on the declaratory 
order as precedent in a proceeding against a third party found in noncompliance. Another 
advantage of a declaratory order, in contrast to a coercive action such as a cease-and-desist 
order, is that it “may be either affirmative or negative, whereas the cease-and-desist order is 
necessarily negative.” Davis, supra note 63, at 203. The advantage of a negative use of a 
declaratory order is that an agency may use it to disapprove of a party’s proposed action 
before imposing a sanction or requiring the party to act in peril of sanction.
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only in the factual circumstances on which it is based.90 A regulated party that 
has requested and received a declaratory order based on certain facts will not be 
able to use the order to shield itself in a subsequent state or federal enforcement 
proceeding based on different facts.91 Finally, like judicial opinions, agency 
declaratory orders may have precedential value that exceeds their binding 
effect.92 Agency personnel and regulated parties not subject to an order may 
nonetheless refer to it for reliable guidance. In some cases, courts may even rely 
upon an administrative declaratory order to resolve a dispute between private 
parties who were not party to the agency’s adjudication.93
It bears emphasizing that the binding effect of a declaratory order does not 
prevent an agency from adopting a different interpretation or pursuing a 
different policy in a subsequent proceeding, including through another 
declaratory order or in an enforcement proceeding or other adjudication.94 This 
is so even if the agency has successfully defended its first interpretation in the 
federal courts.95 After all, as the D.C. Circuit has observed, “an ambiguous or 
broadly worded statute may admit of more than one interpretation that is 
reasonable and consistent with Congressional intent.”96 As in rulemaking, an 
agency is permitted to change its position on an issue so long as it explains the 
decision and the new interpretation is reasonable and permissible in light of the 
relevant statutory language.97
                                                                                                                     
90 See Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1551 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Cent. 
Freight Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 899 F.2d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he 
order in this case settles rights and removes uncertainty in that it allows [the named freight 
carrier] to rely on its interstate certificate as authorization for its actions so long as its 
operations conform to the facts it presented to the ICC and which the ICC assumed in the 
declaratory order.”).
91 See, e.g., Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 5 F.3d at 918 (“The [declaratory] order 
would not insulate the [regulated parties] from a state regulatory proceeding if facts are 
presented which are different from those assumed in the declaratory order.”); Cent. Freight 
Lines, 899 F.2d at 418 (“[T]he ICC’s order in this case would not insulate the carrier from a 
state law regulatory proceeding if facts were proved that were different from those supposed 
by the order.”).
92 See, e.g., Radiofone, Inc. v. FCC, 759 F.2d 936, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing the 
precedential value of a declaratory order).
93 See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Arctic Express, Inc., 87 
F. Supp. 2d 820, 828–31 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (giving Chevron deference to an ICC declaratory 
order and relying on the precedential value of that order to resolve the case before it). 
94 See Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 826 
F.2d 1074, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc); see also Cent. Freight Lines, 899 F.2d at 417 
(affirming an ICC declaratory order in which “[t]o reach [its] conclusion, the ICC found it 
necessary to overrule an earlier decision”).
95 See, e.g., Clark-Cowlitz, 826 F.2d at 1080–81 (“[A]s to claim preclusion, FERC’s
successfully defending its position (at that time) in [an appeal from its previous declaratory 
order] does not bar it from asserting a different position in the current proceedings.”).
96 Id. at 1080.
97 See, e.g., Cent. Freight Lines, 899 F.2d at 423–26 (upholding an agency declaratory 
order that adequately explained its decision to overrule prior agency precedent to establish a 
new interpretation of the agency’s statute); Clark-Cowlitz, 826 F.2d at 1079–80 (affirming 
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Finally, in the absence of any manifest injustice, a declaratory order may 
have retroactive effect. “The general principle is that when as an incident of its 
adjudicatory function an agency interprets a statute, it may apply the new 
interpretation in the proceeding before it.”98 This general principle applies so 
long as the retrospective application of the agency’s new interpretation will 
work no manifest injustice.99 The D.C. Circuit has articulated “a non-exhaustive 
list of five factors” used to evaluate a claim of manifest injustice.100 These 
factors include: 
(1) whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new 
rule represents an abrupt departure from well established practice or merely 
attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the 
party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the 
degree of the burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the 
statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the 
old standard.101
Although the courts “have generally shown little or no deference to 
agencies’ rejection of claims that retroactivity produced manifest injustice,”
they “have been quite deferential to decisions regarding the retroactive effect of 
agency action where retroactivity would not work a manifest injustice.”102
Moreover, the fact that an agency’s decision resolves some uncertainty in the 
law (as declaratory orders often do) does not ordinarily suggest any manifest 
injustice in that decision’s retroactive application.103
In sum, an administrative declaratory order may be defined as an agency (1) 
order, produced through adjudication, (2) that resolves uncertainty or terminates 
controversy (3) without imposing sanctions by (4) binding the agency and the 
named party or parties (5) on the facts stated (6) and with optional retroactive 
effect, in the absence of any manifest injustice, (7) providing guidance to agency 
                                                                                                                     
agency reversal of position that was reasonable and properly explained); see also FCC v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009) (holding that an agency’s
decision to reverse its position must be adequately explained, but is subject to no more 
searching review than was its initial decision); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005) (holding that Chevron applies to an agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term, even if a court has previously interpreted that 
term).
98 Clark-Cowlitz, 826 F.2d at 1081 (citing NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 
765–66 (1969)). But see id. at 1093 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (“There is no such general 
principle under the law.”).
99 Id. at 1081 (majority opinion).
100 Id.
101 Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 
1972); see also Clark-Cowlitz, 826 F.2d at 1081–86 (using the Retail, Wholesale factors to 
evaluate (and ultimately reject) a claim that FERC’s retrospective application of a new 
interpretation worked a manifest injustice).
102 Qwest Servs. Corp. v. FCC, 509 F.3d 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
103 Id. at 540.
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personnel, other regulated parties, courts, and the public through its precedential 
effect. 
C. Formal vs. Informal Adjudication
The text of the APA suggests another possible characteristic of the 
declaratory order: it is necessarily a creature of formal adjudication.104 If so, 
two significant consequences might follow. First, agencies might only be able 
to issue declaratory orders to address matters that are required by statute to be 
conducted in accordance with the APA’s formal adjudication provisions.105
Second, an agency might be required to conduct a hearing on the record before 
it could issue a declaratory order.106
Historically, the dominant view held that the APA’s declaratory orders 
provision applied only in the context of formal adjudications. The legislative 
history strongly suggests that the drafters intended to so limit the availability of 
the device.107 Consistent with this suggestion, the Attorney General’s (AG)
Manual, which was produced immediately after the APA’s adoption, explained 
that the APA’s “grant of authority to the agencies to issue declaratory orders is 
limited by the introductory clause of section 5 so that such declaratory orders 
are authorized only with respect to matters which are required by statute to be 
determined ‘on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.’”108 On this 
view, if no statute requires formal adjudication, or the matter is one exempted 
                                                                                                                     
104 “Formal adjudication” is routinely used as a term of art to refer to adjudications 
conducted in accord with the APA’s adjudication provisions. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–557 
(2012); see, e.g., ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: EVALUATING THE STATUS AND PLACEMENT OF 
ADJUDICATORS IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR HEARING PROGRAM 5 (Mar. 2014) [hereinafter EEOC
REPORT], https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FINAL%20EEOC%20Final
%20Report%20%5B3-31-14%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P59-W4ZJ]. In contrast, “informal 
adjudications” are those not required by statute to be conducted in accord with these 
provisions of the APA. The terminology leaves something to be desired, because many so-
called “informal” adjudications are voluntarily conducted using judicialized procedures that 
look much like those mandated by the APA. Some, including Professor Michael Asimow in 
his work for the Administrative Conference, accordingly eschew the usual terminology. See
Federal Administrative Adjudication Database, ADMIN. CONFERENCE U.S.,
https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/federal-administrative-adjudication 
[https://perma.cc/PLV8-HMS4]. For the sake of simplicity, however, this Article will use 
the terms “formal” and “informal” in their traditional senses.
105 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(1)–(6) (2012) (providing that § 554 applies to “every case of 
adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an 
agency hearing,” with six enumerated exceptions). 
106 Cf. Wilson v. A.H. Belo Corp., 87 F.3d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1996).
107 See, e.g., S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 263 (1946) (stating that declaratory orders under 
§ 5(d) “may be issued only where the agency is empowered by statute to hold hearings and 
the subject is not otherwise expressly exempted [by the introductory clauses of this 
section]”).
108 AG’S MANUAL, supra note 24, at 59.
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from the APA’s formal adjudication provisions, § 5(d)’s grant of authority to 
issue declaratory orders is unavailable to the agency.109 As an example, the 
AG’s Manual explained that the new provision did not authorize the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue declaratory orders in lieu of informal 
advisory opinions as to whether particular securities must be registered under 
the Securities Act because there was “no statutory agency hearing procedure in 
which this question can be determined.”110 For decades following the APA’s
adoption, scholars and experts generally also interpreted the statute to limit the 
issuance of declaratory orders to formal adjudications.111
This historical view has since been abandoned. Courts have held that 
agencies may issue declaratory orders in informal adjudicatory proceedings to 
address matters not subject to formal adjudication under the APA and without 
first conducting a hearing on the record.112 The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning113 paved the way for this approach. 
In Weinberger, the Court rejected an argument that the Food and Drug 
Administration could not issue a declaratory order to address a matter that the 
parties argued was susceptible of resolution “only in a court proceeding where 
there is an adjudication ‘on the record of [a] hearing.’”114 Concluding that the 
APA “does not place administrative proceedings in that straitjacket,” the Court 
reasoned that “paralysis would result if case-by-case battles in the courts were 
the only way [for an agency] to protect the public.”115 Subsequent courts have 
read Weinberger more expansively to mean that agencies may issue declaratory 
orders under 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) through informal adjudication.116 Scholars who 
                                                                                                                     
109 See id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(1)–(6) (enumerating exceptions to the APA’s
formal adjudication requirements).
110 AG’S MANUAL, supra note 24, at 59.
111 See TASK FORCE ON LEGAL SERVS. & PROCEDURE, HOOVER COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE 
EXEC. BRANCH OF THE GOV’T, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 189 (Mar. 
1955) [hereinafter HOOVER COMM’N REPORT]; Goldner, supra note 62, at 8; Hickey, supra 
note 88, at 90; Powell, Administratively Declaring Order, supra note 27, at 279; Note, supra 
note 80, at 311–12. But see Davis, supra note 63, at 230–32 (arguing that the apparent textual 
limitations on the use of declaratory orders “have little rational foundation and are probably 
the product of inadvertence” and concluding that an agency’s authority to issue a declaratory 
order in informal adjudication “in spite of the introductory clause of § 5 is consistent with 
statutory language, is supported by legislative history, and is impelled by practical needs”).
112 Another way that agencies may lawfully streamline adjudication is by using 
summary decision procedures. See Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 70-3, 
Summary Decision in Agency Adjudication, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,782, 19,785 (July 23, 1973).
113 Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
114 Id. at 625–26.
115 Id. at 626. The Court further observed that “great inequities might well result” if the 
FDA was required to proceed individually as “competitors selling drugs in the same category 
would go scot-free until the tedious and laborious procedures of litigation reached them.” Id.
116 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 796–97 (5th Cir. 2000); 
Wilson v. A.H. Belo Corp., 87 F.3d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1996); Texas v. United States, 866 
F.2d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1989). Some opinions, however, seem still to imply (typically 
without analysis) that the APA’s grant of authority to issue declaratory orders is limited to 
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have addressed the issue in more recent times have interpreted the APA
similarly.117
Although it appears to be well settled, this modern interpretation of the APA 
is questionable. First, the Supreme Court’s discussion in Weinberger is 
extremely brief and does not adequately explain why the historical interpretation 
of 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) ought to be abandoned.118 This may be because the Court 
was principally concerned with the question of whether an agency may issue a 
declaratory order without first conducting a full hearing on the record, as 
required by statute.119 And yet later courts have cited the case—also with 
minimal discussion—to support the rather different proposition that an agency 
may issue a declaratory order through informal adjudicatory procedures or to 
address a matter not subject to formal adjudication under the APA.120 A second 
difficulty is that there is some indication in the case law that the courts, like most 
federal agencies, are unfamiliar with the declaratory order and have overlooked 
the provision of the APA that creates the device. For example, in granting 
Chevron deference to and upholding the FCC’s declaratory ruling in National 
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, the Court 
erroneously described the agency’s action as a “rulemaking proceeding.”121 In 
the more recent decision of City of Arlington v. FCC, the Court demonstrated a 
similar inattentiveness to the nature of the declaratory ruling under review and 
the statutory authority under which it was issued.122 Other courts have also 
demonstrated a lack of awareness and understanding of the declaratory order.123
Nonetheless, the modern interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) is in accord 
with prevailing background principles of administrative law that recognize 
                                                                                                                     
matters required by statute to be adjudicated in accord with the APA’s formal adjudication 
provisions. See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Arctic Express, 87 F. Supp. 2d 
820, 828 n.11 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) in conjunction with 5 U.S.C. 
§ 554(a)).
117 See Lubbers & Morant, supra note 16, at 1112–14.
118 See Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 625–26.
119 Id.
120 See Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 796–97; Wilson, 87 F.3d at 397; Texas, 866 F.2d at 
1555.
121 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977
(2005). The opinions do not cite 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) and contain no indication that the justices 
understood that the FCC’s action was taken under that provision.
122 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013) (“It suffices to 
decide this case that the preconditions to deference under Chevron are satisfied because 
Congress has unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to administer the 
Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency interpretation at 
issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”). Once again, none of the opinions 
in the case cite 5 U.S.C. § 554(e). Id. To its credit, the Fifth Circuit understood the nature of 
the FCC’s action, although it questioned the propriety of the FCC’s choice of policymaking 
form. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 240–46 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct.
1863 (2013).
123 See Exelon Wind 1, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2014).
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substantial agency discretion over procedural matters.124 One such principle 
holds that “[a]gencies have discretion to choose between adjudication and 
rulemaking as a means of setting policy.”125 At a more granular level, agencies 
also have substantial discretion to define the procedures they will use to conduct 
specific kinds of proceedings.126 This discretion is limited only by the 
requirement that agencies observe the minimum (and minimal) requirements 
imposed by the APA and the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.127 The 
broad scope of agency procedural discretion is especially impactful in informal 
adjudication, perhaps in part because the APA does not establish minimum 
procedural requirements for informal adjudication, as it does for informal 
rulemaking.128 Here, the consequence of agency discretion is extraordinary 
diversity among the procedures employed in the many informal adjudication 
programs that exist throughout the federal government.129 More importantly, 
according to this view, the APA’s express grant to agencies of authority to issue 
declaratory orders in formal adjudications need not be read—and has not been 
read—to prevent agencies from using their otherwise broad procedural 
discretion to use declaratory orders in informal adjudications.130 In keeping with 
this approach, the D.C. Circuit has implied that an agency’s authority to issue a 
declaratory order in informal adjudication may be grounded in its own 
                                                                                                                     
124 Whether this prevailing approach is consistent with the original convention reached 
upon the adoption of the APA is a question well worth consideration, but beyond the scope 
of this Article. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the 
Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002). 
125 Am. Airlines, 202 F.2d at 797 (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, 
Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974)); see also Cent. Tex. Tel. Coop., Inc. v. FCC, 402 F.3d 205, 
210 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying this principle to FCC’s use of declaratory ruling); British 
Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 584 F.2d 982, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(explaining that “[w]hile rulemaking might well be advisable, or even required, when
mandating the filing of information not plainly within the comprehension of extant statutes 
and regulations, the Board was well within the bounds of procedural propriety in using a 
declaratory order” to clarify filing requirements (citing Yale Broad. Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 
594, 599–601 (D.C. Cir. 1973))). 
126 E.g., Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 703 F.2d 447, 451 (10th Cir. 1983) 
(“[A]dministrative agencies retain substantial discretion in formulating, interpreting, and 
applying their own procedural rules.” (citing Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 
397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970))).
127 Id. 
128 See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 873 F.2d 325, 337 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining that “no provision of the APA contains specific procedures to 
govern an informal agency adjudication”). Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (establishing 
minimum procedures for informal rulemaking without requiring observance of the hearing 
requirements of § 556 and § 557), with id. § 554(c)(2) (establishing minimum procedures for 
adjudications formally conducted in accord with § 556 and § 557).
129 See Federal Administrative Adjudication Database, supra note 104 (cataloging the 
diverse array of informal adjudicatory procedures created and employed by agencies).
130 Cf. EEOC REPORT, supra note 104, at 23–32 (arguing that the mandatory use of 
administrative law judges (ALJs) in formal adjudication implies no restriction on agency 
discretion to voluntarily appoint ALJs to preside in informal adjudications).
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regulations, even if there is some doubt regarding the applicability of § 5(d) to 
the proceeding at issue.131
D. History of Agency Use of Declaratory Orders
Although the APA’s declaratory orders provision was intended to have a 
substantial effect on administrative practice, agencies historically have made 
little use of it.132 Studies conducted in the 1950s revealed minimal use of the 
then-recent grant of authority.133 In 1955, the Hoover Commission’s Task Force 
on Legal Services and Procedure described agency use of declaratory orders as 
“negligible.”134 A contemporaneous study by the House Committee on 
Government Operations found that “[o]ut of 38 agencies engaged in 
adjudicative activities, only 7 acknowledged that they had issued declaratory 
orders under the APA.”135 By the early 1960s, only two agencies had adopted 
procedural regulations governing the issuance of declaratory orders.136 As of 
the end of that same decade, one additional agency had followed suit.137
Limited agency use of declaratory orders persisted well beyond the APA’s
infancy. In 1968, an American Bar Association subcommittee reported that only 
two surveyed agencies (the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and the Federal 
Maritime Commission (FMC)) had adopted procedural rules for issuing 
“declaratory orders,”138 while a third agency (the FCC) had adopted procedural 
rules for issuing “declaratory rulings.”139 The subcommittee concluded that, 
                                                                                                                     
131 See Cent. Tex. Tel. Coop., Inc. v. FCC, 402 F.3d 205, 210 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
132 See Schwartz, supra note 83, at 1212–13.
133 See Goldner, supra note 62, at 10–15; see also Reilly, supra note 60, at 659 (“The 
history of the past twenty years demonstrates that the declaratory order has been largely 
ignored by our administrative agencies.”).
134 HOOVER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 111, at 188–89.
135 Reilly, supra note 60, at 659 (citing WALTER GELLHORN & CLARK BYSE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 701–02 (4th ed. 1960)).
136 Id. (citing DALMAS H. NELSON, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES OF THE USA: THEIR 
DECISIONS AND AUTHORITY 76–77 (1964)). 
137 Id. at 659–60.
138 See Comment, Declaratory Orders—Uncertain Tools To Remove Uncertainty, 21 
ADMIN. L. REV. 257, 258 (1968). The report, which was prepared by the Subcommittee on 
Declaratory Orders of the Administrative Process Committee of the American Bar 
Association’s Administrative Law Section, surveyed the use of declaratory orders by the 
ICC, FPC, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), SEC, FCC, FMC, and FDA. See id. at 257.
139 The report expressed skepticism about the accuracy of the FCC’s position that 
“declaratory rulings” and “declaratory orders” are synonymous. See id. at 258 (noting that 
“a recent Court of Appeals decision has cast considerable doubt upon validity of [the FCC’s] 
attempted analogy”). It is interesting that this terminological issue created such controversy 
given that the FCC was not the first to refer to the “declaratory ruling.” See AG’S REPORT,
supra note 15, at 30–31. The FCC has continued to use the “declaratory ruling” terminology 
to the present day, and the courts have concluded that, despite the differing terminology, 
such rulings qualify as adjudicatory orders. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 241 
(5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
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despite the apparent usefulness of declaratory orders, “neither the agencies nor 
the practicing bar are availing themselves of the declaratory order procedures 
presently available to the degree expected when the project was undertaken.”140
Only forty-three petitions for declaratory order were filed with the FPC between 
1946 and 1966, and “11 of these were filed in 1966.”141 The practice before the 
FMC was even more limited, with only four petitions for declaratory order 
docketed between 1961 and 1966.142 The FCC’s use of “declaratory rulings”
was also limited to “only a dozen or so instances” in the 1950s and “a mere 
‘handful’ in the early 1960s.”143 More recent studies conducted since that time 
suggest ongoing and pervasive administrative indifference to declaratory 
orders.144
At least two of the explanations that have been offered to explain this 
indifference were grounded in interpretations of the APA that no longer 
prevail.145 First, and as discussed previously in Part II.C., the inclusion of the 
declaratory orders provision in the APA’s formal adjudication provision was 
long viewed as a significant limitation on the availability of the device. 
Although the courts began to move away from this interpretation in the 1970s, 
it appears to have continued to hold sway within the bar until at least the 
1980s.146 More recently, however, the courts’ position has become clearer, and 
expert opinion appears to have evolved accordingly.147 As discussed in greater 
detail in Part III.A., below, the few agencies that have a robust declaratory 
orders practice often use these orders to address matters not subject to 
mandatory formal adjudication under the APA. Second, some have placed 
blame on the statute’s language authorizing an agency “in its sound discretion”
to issue a declaratory order,148 which suggests the possibility of an agency 
exercising its discretion not to issue a declaratory order.149 Initially, the courts 
                                                                                                                     
140 Comment, supra note 138, at 263.
141 Id. at 259.
142 Id. at 260.
143 Id. at 260–61. The survey of the FCC was published separately and provides greater 
detail. See generally Arthur Stambler, The Declaratory Order at the Federal 
Communications Commission, 21 FED. COMM. B.J. 123 (1967).
144 See Powell, Sinners, supra note 25, at 344–45, 372.
145 E.g., Reilly, supra note 60, at 660 (“Blame for the ineffectiveness of section 5(d) has, 
at times, been primarily assigned to the agencies intended to utilize its provisions. It is more 
accurate, however, to state that fault lies as heavily with the authors of the provision as it 
does with the agencies.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
146 See Powell, Administratively Declaring Order, supra note 27, at 279; see also supra 
notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
147 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 241 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct.
1863 (2013); Lubbers & Morant, supra note 16, at 1112.
148 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2012).
149 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 83, at 1213 (arguing that the minimal use of 
declaratory orders “has been due primarily to the fact that under Section 5(d) the question of 
whether a declaratory order should be issued in a particular case is left to the discretion of 
the agency concerned”). 
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held that such a negative exercise of discretion was unreviewable, a remedy that 
may have emboldened agencies in their disinclination to use declaratory orders. 
As discussed below, however, this interpretation was short-lived and is no 
longer good law.150
Other explanations for the modest effect of § 5(d) have been grounded not 
in law but in practical considerations. Although enthusiasm for declaratory 
orders appears to have been widespread over the years,151 a minority of experts 
has been deeply skeptical of the usefulness of declaratory orders in the 
administrative context.152 For example, two scholars at the Brookings 
Institution, writing just before the APA’s enactment, argued that the declaratory 
order “seems inapplicable to all controversies settled by administrative action”
and “would be fraught with many dangers.”153 A more commonly expressed 
concern has been that a more receptive attitude towards declaratory orders (and 
petitions therefor) might result in a flood of requests that would impose a 
significant burden on agencies and undermine their ability to establish their own 
priorities and determine how best to use limited available resources.154 Perhaps 
out of a desire to discourage petitions for declaratory order, most agencies have 
not adopted procedures governing declaratory proceedings.155 The private 
sector also apparently has been reluctant to request declaratory relief from 
administrative agencies.156 Finally, it has been argued persuasively that the 
                                                                                                                     
150 See infra Part III.A.
151 See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 89, at 155 (“There is a clear need for a [declaratory] 
device within the administrative process, which in many of its branches is even more 
dynamic and more comprehensive, and therefore a source of even more uncertainty, than the 
law of the judicial process.”); see also infra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing the 
substantial support over the years for expanded agency use of declaratory orders).
152 See Blachly & Oatman, supra note 86, at 417–21; see also Powell, Sinners, supra
note 25, at 345 (noting that some have objected to declaratory orders in administrative 
adjudication because of “the alleged lack of concreteness that would attend agency attempts 
to resolve disputes prior to the point at which the application of agency compliance sanctions 
would be appropriate”).
153 Blachly & Oatman, supra note 86, at 418.
154 See, e.g., id. at 419 (arguing that “administrative authorities might well be so beset 
with requests for declarations as to seriously interfere with their work”). This same concern 
arises in connection with petitions for rulemaking. See SCHWARTZ & REVESZ, supra note 27,
at 61.
155 See, e.g., Powell, Sinners, supra note 25, at 372 (“The procedure is under-utilized as 
a result of the continuing failure of most federal agencies to adopt explicit implementing 
regulations.”).
156 See, e.g., Goldner, supra note 62, at 10 (noting that “the businessmen and other 
individuals who should request the[] issuance” of declaratory orders “are slow to adopt this 
form of procedure”). It is hard to say why the private sector historically has given declaratory 
orders such a cold reception. One explanation may be reluctance to try a new, untested 
procedure in lieu of the established methods of conducting business with the agency. The 
agencies’ general failure to adopt procedural regulations governing declaratory proceedings 
may have rendered the device obscure (and thus unnoticed by the private bar) or may have 
given regulated parties the impression that petitions for declaratory order would be 
unwelcome or ineffective and, thus, a waste of time and resources.
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ability to provide regulatory guidance through nonbinding documents not 
subject to judicial review has simply offered a comparatively more attractive
alternative to the declaratory order.157
Scholars, government officials, and other experts have consistently argued 
that agencies should expand the use of declaratory orders, and some of the more 
formidable obstacles to achieving that goal have been removed over the 
years.158 The courts have moved away from interpreting the APA to limit 
declaratory orders to formal adjudication and no longer deem absolute the 
agencies’ discretion to refuse requests for declaratory relief.159 In addition, in 
recent decades, courts have demonstrated a greater willingness to review other 
forms of nonbinding regulatory guidance.160 Concerned about agency 
avoidance of the increasingly ossified rulemaking process, courts are more 
likely now to scrutinize an agency’s characterization of a document as guidance 
or an interpretative rule exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment 
requirements.161 The question of how to distinguish between legislative rules 
and nonlegislative rules or other nonbinding guidance is exceptionally difficult 
and a matter subject to much debate.162 The Supreme Court recently declined 
an opportunity to provide some clarity on this matter.163
Despite all this, modern administrative practice has changed little: 
declaratory orders remain underused. As Part IV details, there are still relatively 
few agencies that issue declaratory orders or have regulations establishing 
procedures for conducting declaratory proceedings. Before turning to that 
discussion, however, some consideration of the issues that arise in connection 
with judicial review of administrative declaratory orders is in order.
                                                                                                                     
157 See Powell, Sinners, supra note 25, at 353–56; cf. Goldner, supra note 62, at 15 (“The 
underlying, recurrent theme of the letters received by the author [from federal agencies] is 
that the agencies who determine private rights are loath to issue a ruling which binds them 
conclusively.”).
158 See, e.g., HOOVER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 111, at 187 (“Agencies should make 
greater use of declaratory orders, advisory opinions, and other shortened procedures.”);
Gellhorn, supra note 89, at 159 (arguing that inclusion of the declaratory orders provision in 
the APA “should prove extremely valuable”); Lubbers & Morant, supra note 16, at 1100 
(urging increased agency use of declaratory orders).
159 See supra Part II.C.
160 See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000) (holding that an EPA guidance document was final agency action subject to 
judicial review).
161 See, e.g., id. at 1020 (expressing concern that agencies are increasingly shifting to 
the use of guidance documents as a way of avoiding the rulemaking process and evading 
judicial review). See generally Robert A. Anthony, Interpretative Rules, Policy Statements, 
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind the 
Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992).
162 See generally John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893 
(2004); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 547 (2000). 
163 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015).
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III. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND RELATED LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
This Part examines the legal issues that arise in connection with judicial 
review of declaratory orders. Rather than providing an exhaustive analysis of 
judicial precedent, it focuses on the issues that may be most relevant from the 
perspective of an agency that is considering whether, how, and in what 
circumstances to use declaratory orders. Part III.A. begins by discussing the 
judicial reviewability of declaratory orders and agency refusals to institute 
declaratory order proceedings, including by addressing the limitations on 
collateral challenges to declaratory orders. Part III.B. explains that, although the 
case and controversy requirement of Article III does not restrict an agency’s
authority to issue a declaratory order, it may impede a court’s ability to judicially 
review the order. Part III.B. also considers conceptually related issues that may 
affect (legally or prudentially) an agency’s issuance of a declaratory order. Part 
III.C. concludes by surveying the substantially deferential standards that courts 
apply in judicial review of declaratory orders.
A. Direct Review and Collateral Challenge
Generally speaking, declaratory orders are final agency action subject to 
judicial review.164 As the Supreme Court explained in Bennett v. Spear, two 
conditions must be met in order for agency action to qualify as “final” and 
subject to judicial review.165 First, the action “must not be of a merely tentative 
or interlocutory nature,”166 but rather “must mark the ‘consummation’ of the 
agency’s decisionmaking process.”167 Second, the agency’s “action must be one 
by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal 
consequences will flow.’”168 As the case law demonstrates, this test is usually 
satisfied by an agency’s issuance of a declaratory order.169 That result is 
                                                                                                                     
164 See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012); see also, e.g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & 
Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 627 (1973) (holding that a declaratory order is judicially 
reviewable under the APA (citing Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 
(1956))).
165 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997).
166 Id. at 178; see also Intercity Transp. Co. v. United States, 737 F.2d 103, 107 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (holding that an ICC declaratory order was final agency action subject to judicial 
review).
167 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. 
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)).
168 Id. at 178 (quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget 
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
169 See, e.g., Cent. Freight Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 899 F.2d 413, 418 
(5th Cir. 1990) (“[B]ecause the ICC’s order both settles rights and touches vital interests of 
carriers, this court has jurisdiction to review the order.”); W. Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Am. 
Indus., Inc., 893 F.2d 229, 233–234 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that an ICC declaratory order 
was final agency action subject to judicial review). There have been rare instances in which 
courts have held declaratory orders unreviewable. See infra Part III.B.
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consistent with the intentions of the APA’s supporters, who viewed the 
availability of judicial review as a necessary corollary of the binding legal effect 
of a declaratory order.170
An agency’s denial of a petition for a declaratory order or other refusal to 
institute a declaratory proceeding also typically qualifies as final agency action 
subject to judicial review.171 This principle, now well established, was initially 
questioned because 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) authorizes agencies to issue declaratory 
orders in their “sound discretion.”172 When first presented with the question, 
courts interpreted this language to mean that the decision whether to issue a 
declaratory order was committed to agency discretion by law and was therefore 
unreviewable.173 That approach, however, was much criticized and did not 
survive.174 Today, courts read the statute’s reference to “sound discretion” as an 
indication that an agency’s refusal to issue a declaratory order is, at least to some 
extent, reviewable.175
Declaratory orders may also come before the courts collaterally, when a 
court is called upon to interpret or apply an agency’s statute or regulation to 
resolve a dispute between two private parties or review a state or local 
regulator’s enforcement action.176 In some cases, a declaratory order may 
become relevant to matters at issue in later litigation between private parties, in 
which case the order may have preclusive effect.177 In other instances, a 
declaratory order may offer a useful procedural vehicle for an agency to answer 
a question that first arises in litigation and is then referred to the agency by the 
court. Such referrals are typically made under the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction, a prudential doctrine that allows a court to stay litigation and order 
the parties to seek resolution of an issue from an administrative agency that has 
been vested with “special competence” to address it.178 If a party is aggrieved 
                                                                                                                     
170 See AG’S REPORT, supra note 15, at 33.
171 See Intercity, 737 F.2d at 106–107. 
172 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2012).
173 See United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 203 F.2d 78, 78–79 (5th Cir. 
1953); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (exempting from judicial review “agency action [that] 
is committed to agency discretion by law”).
174 See Intercity, 737 F.2d at 106–07; see, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 83, at 1248–49 
(describing the holding of United Gas Pipeline as “doubtful” and arguing that the phrase 
“sound discretion” “affects the question of the scope, not that of the availability, of review”); 
Note, supra note 80, at 318–19 (expressing skepticism that “Congress intended ‘sound 
discretion’ to mean absolute discretion” and arguing that “[a]gency refusal to issue a 
declaratory order should be reviewable to determine whether it transgresses the realm of 
‘sound discretion’”).
175 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (emphasis added); see Intercity, 737 F.2d at 106–08; see also id.
at 106 n.4 (discussing the legislative history). The scope of review is discussed below. See
Part III.C.
176 See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Arctic Express, Inc., 87 
F. Supp. 2d 820, 828 (S.D. Ohio 2000); see also infra Part IV.A.
177 See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015).
178 S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 750 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(quoting United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956)). See generally Aaron J. 
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by a declaratory order issued in response to such a judicial referral, that party 
must file for direct judicial review within the applicable deadline for appeal. If 
it fails to so challenge the order, the referring court will ordinarily refuse to 
entertain a collateral challenge to the agency’s decision.179 To put it another 
way, the parties to a declaratory order, as well as a court called upon to 
adjudicate related claims, are bound by an agency’s declaratory order once the 
time for direct appeal of that order has expired.180
B. Barriers to Judicial Review of Declaratory Orders
Although it is well established that the case and controversy requirement of 
Article III does not apply to administrative agencies, this constitutional 
limitation on the judicial power occasionally prevents judicial review of 
declaratory orders or agency refusals to grant requests for declaratory relief.181
                                                                                                                     
Lockwood, Note, The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine: Competing Standards of Appellate 
Review, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707 (2007) (discussing the development, contours, and 
application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine). As Mr. Lockwood explains, “[b]ecause it 
is applied infrequently, the shape of this doctrine is not fully defined. The circuit courts 
employ differing conceptions of primary jurisdiction, utilize different factors in their 
analysis, and apply different standards of review.” Id. at 708 (footnotes omitted). In the case
law related to declaratory orders, the courts loosely refer to an agency’s “primary 
jurisdiction” without making any referral, often as a way of explaining why it was 
appropriate for an agency to address a particular issue through a previously issued 
declaratory order. See, e.g., Ill. Terminal R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 671 F.2d 
1214, 1216 (8th Cir. 1982) (explaining that “[t]he ICC acted properly” in issuing the 
declaratory order appealed from because “courts have long recognized that interpretation of 
terms of art is within the special province or primary jurisdiction of the ICC and therefore 
should, in the first instance, be decided by the ICC”). This appears particularly common in 
cases involving the ICC, perhaps because the primary jurisdiction “doctrine arises from a 
series of Supreme Court cases addressing the [ICC].” Lockwood, supra, at 710.
179 See Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Town of Ayer, 191 F. Supp. 2d 257, 261–62 (D. Mass. 
2002), rev’d on other grounds, 330 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003). But see Frozen Food Express 
v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 42–43 (1956) (holding that an ICC declaratory order was 
judicially reviewable in district court action filed by a plaintiff “who was not a party to the 
administrative proceeding”).
180 See, e.g., W. Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Am. Indus., Inc., 893 F.2d 229, 234 (9th Cir. 
1990) (holding that until a declaratory order “was reviewed by an appellate court, the parties 
were bound by the [agency’s] determination” and since the parties “did not file a notice of 
appeal from the [agency’s] order . . . this court is barred from reviewing [its] merits”); Bos. 
& Me., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 261–62 (“‘If the aggrieved party fails to challenge the [agency] 
decision within the statutory period, the [agency] decision becomes final and binding upon 
the referring court.’” (quoting Locust Cartage Co. v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 430 
F.2d 334, 341 (1st Cir. 1970))).
181 E.g., Cent. Freight Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 899 F.2d 413, 417 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (“It is . . . well established that the case or controversy requirement of Article III 
‘does not restrict an agency’s authority to issue declaratory rulings.’” (quoting Texas v. 
United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1551 (5th Cir. 1989))); see also Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Fed.
Power Comm’n, 606 F.2d 1373, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The subject matter of agencies’
jurisdiction naturally is not confined to cases or controversies inasmuch as agencies are 
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Most of these barriers arise because the scope of agency authority under 5 
U.S.C. § 554(e) is broader than the scope of the courts’ authority under Article 
III.182 The difficulty is grounded in the APA’s grant of authority to agencies to 
issue declaratory orders to “remove uncertainty” in the absence of an actual 
controversy between adverse parties.183 Indeed, the core purpose of the 
administrative declaratory order—to provide binding guidance to regulated 
parties before they have acted in peril of regulatory sanction—may be in some 
circumstances at odds with the Constitution’s prohibition on the courts’ issuing 
advisory opinions.184 In other words, as the cases discussed below reveal, 
administrative agencies have greater flexibility to issue declaratory orders in 
circumstances in which the Article III requirements of justiciability would not 
be satisfied.
Miller v. FCC provides a good example of how the disconnect between 
administrative and judicial power may thwart judicial review of an 
administrative declaratory order.185 In Miller, the Eleventh Circuit was called 
upon to review an FCC declaratory ruling addressing the preemptive effect of 
§ 315(b) of the Communications Act of 1934.186 Section 315(b) establishes the 
“lowest unit charge,” a limitation on the amount that a political candidate may 
be charged for the broadcast of campaign advertisements.187 In 1991, the FCC 
issued a declaratory ruling stating that “any state cause of action dependent on 
any determination of the lowest unit charge under Section 315(b) of the 
Communications Act . . . is preempted by federal law,” and that “[t]he sole 
                                                                                                                     
creatures of article I.”). The sponsors of § 5(d) of the APA noted that agencies would “be as 
free to act irrespective of the technical rules of case or controversy as courts are.” S. DOC.
NO. 79-248, at 362 (1946). 
182 Compare 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2012), with U.S. CONST. art. III. 
183 5 U.S.C. § 554(e); see also Coal. for a Healthy Cal. v. FCC, 87 F.3d 383, 386 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (“[W]hile the FCC might properly issue such a general declaration which does 
not settle an actual controversy between adverse parties, this court cannot.”); Hickey, supra
note 88, at 91 n.7 (noting that “the constitutional limitation to ‘case and controversy’ . . . is 
not strictly imposed upon an administrative agency” and “[a]s a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the only possible meaning that can be given to the words ‘remove uncertainty’
is that Congress intended to expand the availability of declaratory relief beyond its 
application to orthodox controversies”).
184 Cf. AG’S REPORT, supra note 15, at 30–31 (discussing advisory function of 
declaratory orders); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 734–35 (1978) 
(“However appropriate it may be for an administrative agency to write broadly in an 
adjudicatory proceeding, federal courts have never been empowered to issue advisory 
opinions.”). In the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress appears to have recognized this 
potential disconnect, by expressly limiting a federal court to granting declaratory relief “[i]n 
a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012); see also 
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 325 (1936) (upholding the constitutionality 
of the Declaratory Judgement Act because, by its terms, the Act “does not attempt to change 
the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial power”).
185 Miller v. FCC, 66 F.3d 1140, 1141 (11th Cir. 1995).
186 Id.
187 Id.
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forum for adjudicating such matters shall be this Commission.”188 The FCC 
issued this declaratory ruling on its own motion and not in response to any 
petition or other request for resolution of a specific controversy.189 On a petition 
for review, the court held the case nonjusticiable because “[b]y asking this court 
to decide what another court should do in a future case, petitioners are posing a 
hypothetical question, the answer to which would be an advisory opinion”
prohibited by Article III.190 The court characterized the agency’s decision as an 
unreviewable “agency opinion,” thereby suggesting that the justiciability 
problem was created by the agency’s mischaracterization of its own action.191
The true source of the difficulty, however, was that the scope of the FCC’s
authority to issue the declaratory order was broader than the scope of the court’s
authority to review that action.192 This became evident when, in parallel 
litigation in which the FCC’s declaratory ruling was relevant but not subject to 
direct review, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Miller court’s characterization and 
held that the agency’s decision was a properly issued declaratory order with 
binding legal effect.193 Perhaps the most interesting point is that both courts 
were right—this particular agency decision was both an unreviewable advisory 
opinion (from the perspective of the reviewing court) and a binding declaratory 
order (from the perspective of the court called upon to apply agency precedent 
in parallel litigation).
In other cases, the courts have perceived the problem as a lack of finality 
that undermines the agency’s classification of its action as a declaratory order. 
For example, in Miami v. Interstate Commerce Commission, the Fifth Circuit 
declined to review an ICC order that was, in the court’s view, merely “styled”
as a declaratory order.194 The underlying dispute involved the City of Miami’s
extended effort to acquire, for use as a public park, a thirty-three acre facility 
owned by the Florida East Coast Railway.195 In condemnation proceedings in 
state court, the railroad argued that the property was a “line of railroad” that 
could be neither condemned nor abandoned “without ICC approval issued in the 
form of a certificate of public convenience and necessity.”196 The state court 
rejected this argument, characterizing the property as a “spur” not subject to the 
                                                                                                                     
188 Id. at 1143 (quoting Exclusive Jurisdiction with Respect to Potential Violations of 
the Lowest Unit Charge Requirements of § 315(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended, 6 FCC Rcd. No. 26, 7511 (1991)).
189 Id. at 1143, 1144.
190 Id. at 1145; see also id. at 1146 (“Consequently, we are prohibited from determining 
the propriety of the FCC’s declaratory ruling given the abstract circumstances in which this 
issue is presented.”).
191 Miller, 66 F.3d at 1144. 
192 Id. 
193 See Wilson v. A.H. Belo Corp., 87 F.3d 393, 397–98 (9th Cir. 1996). 
194 City of Miami v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 669 F.2d 219, 221–22 (5th Cir. 
1982).
195 Id. at 220.
196 Id.
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ICC’s jurisdiction, and approved the taking.197 The railroad responded by 
petitioning the ICC for a declaration that the terminal and tracks at issue were a 
“line of railroad.”198 After seeking input from the city, the ICC issued the 
requested declaration and “ordered its [administrative] proceedings 
‘discontinued.’”199 On a petition for review filed by the city, the Fifth Circuit 
held that the ICC’s declaratory order was nonfinal and unreviewable because it 
neither determined rights or obligations nor produced any legal 
consequences.200 The ICC’s order, explained the court, “neither permit[ted] nor 
prohibit[ed] abandonment of the [railroad’s] terminal.”201 The court therefore 
concluded that the order was “nothing more than an advisory ruling” not subject 
to judicial review.202
The problem may also present itself as one of mootness pending appellate 
review.203 An example of one such case is Radiofone, Inc. v. FCC, which 
involved a petition for review of an FCC declaratory ruling that Auto Page, a 
company that provided radio paging services, was not a common carrier.204 The 
Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) had determined that Auto Page 
was a radio common carrier operating unlawfully without a certificate from the 
LPSC.205 Auto Page sought an injunction against the LPSC’s cease and desist 
order in federal district court, and the court referred the matter to the FCC on 
the grounds of primary jurisdiction.206 The FCC issued notice and requested 
comments from interested parties before issuing a declaratory ruling in Auto 
Page’s favor.207 Although Auto Page (perhaps unsurprisingly) did not file for 
review of the order, several other commenters in the proceeding did.208 While 
                                                                                                                     
197 Id.
198 See id. The railroad did not, however, seek a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity from the ICC, perhaps to avoid issuance of the approval it had argued was a 
necessary precondition to condemnation. See id.
199 Id. at 220–21.
200 Miami, 669 F.2d at 220 (quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n. v. 
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
201 Id. at 221.
202 Id. at 222.
203 E.g., Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 606 F.2d 1373, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (“Judicial review of administrative action, like all exercises of the federal judicial 
power, is circumscribed by the requirement that there be an actual controversy. Accordingly, 
we have no jurisdiction over suits challenging administrative orders which are moot.”); see
also Hollister Ranch Owners’ Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 759 F.2d 898, 902 
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
204 See Radiofone, Inc. v. FCC, 759 F.2d 936, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
205 See id. at 937.
206 Id. at 937.
207 Id. at 937–38.
208 See id. at 938. It seems obvious that Auto Page would have had no reason to seek 
judicial review of the declaratory order that granted Auto Page the very relief it had 
requested. The identity of the litigants in this case is important because it reveals that, 
although a declaratory order may bind only the named party, other interested parties may 
still be able to seek judicial review of that order. Id.
2017] THE AGENCY DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 1199
the D.C. Circuit’s decision was pending, Auto Page went out of business.209 The 
court held that the case was moot as a result of this development, and it 
accordingly vacated the FCC’s order.210 Through vacatur, the court deprived the 
FCC’s order of its value as administrative precedent.211
Finally, a more straightforward barrier to judicial review arises when a party 
that lacks standing under Article III petitions a court for review of a declaratory 
order. On this issue, Radiofone is again the primary judicial precedent. In that 
case, the judges were unanimous as to the proper result, and then-Judge Scalia 
authored the majority opinion.212 In a part of that opinion not joined by his two 
colleagues, Judge Scalia reasoned that Auto Page’s demise had deprived the 
petitioners of standing to challenge the FCC’s decision.213 To have standing, he 
explained, a petitioner’s injury must “arise from the particular activity which 
the agency adjudication has approved (here, the operation of Auto Page as a 
private land mobile radio system) and not from the mere precedential effect of 
the agency’s rationale.”214 A related barrier may arise when a party that would 
otherwise have standing to challenge the agency’s action fails to exhaust its 
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of a declaratory order.215
C. Standards of Review
The scope of judicial review on appeal from a declaratory order is limited: 
courts will set aside an agency’s action only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or is based upon factual findings that are not supported by 
substantial evidence.216
                                                                                                                     
209 Id. at 937.
210 See Radiofone, 759 F.2d at 938; see also Oregon v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
636 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In cases where intervening events moot a petition for 
review of an agency order, the proper course is to vacate the underlying order.” (citing A.L. 
Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 330–31 (1961))). 
211 The only circumstances in which courts have vacated a declaratory order because of 
justiciability problems appear to involve disputes that have become moot pending judicial 
review. See, e.g., Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 606 F.2d 1373, 1379 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979). Interestingly, when other barriers to judicial review have been encountered (such 
as when a petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies), courts have left the 
agency’s declaratory order standing as precedent.
212 Radiofone, 759 F.2d at 938.
213 See id. at 938–39.
214 Id. at 939.
215 See, e.g., Richman Bros. Records, Inc. v. FCC, 124 F.3d 1302, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(dismissing a petition for review of a declaratory order issued on delegated authority by the 
FCC’s Common Carrier Bureau because the petitioner did not exhaust administrative 
remedies by filing an application for review by the full Commission). 
216 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1447–48 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983); see also Cent. Freight Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 899 F.2d 413, 419 
(5th Cir. 1990) (“This court may set aside an agency’s adjudicatory ruling, such as a 
declaratory order, only if the agency’s findings or conclusions are ‘arbitrary, capricious, an 
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The narrow scope of review applies to most aspects of a declaratory order, 
including the decision of whether to initiate the proceeding.217 The courts may 
also enforce the APA’s modest requirement that agencies provide a brief
statement of the grounds for denying a petition for declaratory order.218 An 
agency’s considered and plainly stated “judgment that its limited resources are 
better allocated to other areas” has been held sufficient to meet the APA’s
minimal requirements.219 It may similarly be reasonable for an agency to 
“withhold declaratory relief in anticipation of a clearer exposition of 
government policy” that is expected or planned to be forthcoming, or on the 
basis of the agency’s judgment that the petitioner’s circumstances demonstrate 
no “special need” for a declaratory order.220 When a court affirms an agency’s
decision not to issue a declaratory order, it will not opine on what such an order 
should say if it were to be issued.221
Courts generally give substantial deference to the legal interpretations that 
an agency provides in a declaratory order.222 Such deference has been extended 
to an agency’s interpretation of any legal document within that agency’s special 
competence, including: the statute the agency is responsible for 
                                                                                                                     
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A))).
217 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Intercity Trasnp. Co. v. United States, 737 F.2d 103, 108 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984); see also Aviators for Safe & Fairer Regulation, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 
221 F.3d 222, 231 (1st Cir. 2000) (“While the agency has discretion to refuse [a request for 
a declaratory] ruling, that refusal is reviewable for abuse of discretion.”); Cent. Freight 
Lines, 899 F.2d at 418–19 (affirming an agency decision to institute declaratory order 
proceeding because that decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious). The D.C. Circuit has 
opined that “a policy of never instituting declaratory proceedings . . . could well constitute 
an abuse of discretion.” Intercity, 737 F.2d at 110 n.12.
218 See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e). The Administrative Conference recently addressed this 
requirement in connection with petitions for rulemaking. See also SCHWARTZ & REVESZ,
supra note 27, at 17–20. See generally Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 
2014–6, Petitions for Rulemaking, 79 Fed. Reg. 75,114, 75, 117 (Dec. 5, 2014). The APA 
also requires agencies to respond to petitions in a “reasonable time,” see 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), 
and to give petitioners “prompt notice” when a petition is denied in whole or in part. Id.
§ 555(e).
219 Intercity, 737 F.2d at 108–10; see also Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 
703 F.2d 447, 453 (10th Cir. 1983) (“The Commission may reasonably choose to reserve its 
use of declaratory relief for special cases in order to conserve its administrative resources.”).
220 Climax Molybdenum, 703 F.2d at 452–53.
221 E.g., Coal. for a Healthy Cal. v. FCC, 87 F.3d 383, 385–86 (9th Cir. 1996) (declining 
litigant’s invitation to offer advisory opinion on appropriate content of declaratory order that 
the FCC declined to issue); see also id. at 385 n.3 (“Every reported case we have found 
which examined whether an agency improperly refused to issue a declaratory order only 
considered whether the order was improperly withheld, not what the order should have 
been.”).
222 See Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 826 
F.2d 1074, 1086–92 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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administering,223 the agency’s own regulations,224 the terms of art that are used 
within the agency’s regulatory regime,225 and certificates or other authorizations 
that the agency has itself issued.226 In addition, courts generally defer to an 
agency’s jurisdictional determination.227 Courts have afforded Chevron
deference to declaratory orders issued through both formal and informal 
adjudications.228 With respect to orders issued through informal proceedings, a 
basic petitioning process that includes notice and the opportunity for comment 
has been sufficient to warrant Chevron deference.229
Judicial review of an agency’s application of controlling precedent, whether 
judicial or administrative, is similarly limited. A court’s “task on review is to 
decide not whether [it] would construe the precedents as the [agency] did, but 
whether the [agency’s] construction is reasonable and whether it has explained 
                                                                                                                     
223 See, e.g., Cent. Freight Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 899 F.2d 413, 423 
(5th Cir. 1990) (noting that a court “must honor the [agency’s] interpretation of its statute so 
long as that interpretation is a reasonable one” (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984))).
224 See, e.g., Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1459–60 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming FCC 
declaratory ruling and holding that “[t]he Commission’s interpretation of its own regulations 
as applied in this case is reasonable and consistent with section 317 of the Communications 
Act”). Some Justices of the Supreme Court have recently expressed serious and increasing 
doubt about the propriety of judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Auer is not a logical corollary to Chevron but a dangerous permission slip for 
the arrogation of power.”); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining why he has “become increasingly doubtful” of Auer 
deference). If these were to become majority views, the resulting doctrinal sea change would 
presumably apply to the declaratory orders context.
225 See, e.g., Ill. Terminal R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 671 F.2d 1214, 1217 
(8th Cir. 1982) (“We also note that courts should defer to ICC interpretation of technical 
terms.”). 
226 See, e.g., Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 867 
F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 1989) (“We hold the issue is clearly within the ICC’s jurisdiction in 
interpreting whether its certificate covers the transportation.”).
227 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1870–71 (2013); see also, e.g., N.C. 
Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787, 794 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that the FCC’s
“declaratory statement of its primary authority over the interconnection of terminal 
equipment with the national telephone network is a proper and reasonable assertion of 
jurisdiction conferred by the [Communications] Act”).
228 See, e.g., City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874–75 (giving Chevron deference to a 
declaratory ruling issued by the FCC through informal adjudication); Owner-Operator Indep. 
Drivers Ass’n v. Arctic Express, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 820, 828 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (“This Court 
finds that the ICC . . . opinion, a formal adjudication, is entitled to Chevron deference.”).
229 See City of Chi. v. FCC, 199 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court’s discussion 
does not make clear whether the basic notice-and-comment procedures used by the FCC 
were necessary, only that they were sufficient. See id. Part IV, which explores in greater 
detail the procedures that agencies use in declaratory proceedings, suggests that most meet 
the minimum degree of formality needed to secure Chevron deference. See infra Part IV.
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any departures from its past actions.”230 Thus, in one case, the Fifth Circuit 
upheld an ICC declaratory order because the agency “followed its prior cases in 
reaching [its] determination, and it did not unreasonably construe federal 
precedents. It reasonably distinguished cases that might suggest a different 
result.”231 An agency is generally not bound to give preclusive effect to an 
earlier federal or state court judgment if the issue arises out of a statute the 
agency is charged with administering.232
Judicial review of an agency’s findings of fact is also limited. If the agency’s
declaratory order emerges from a formal adjudication and includes factual 
findings grounded in the record, a court will review those findings for 
substantial evidence.233 If the declaratory order is a product of an informal 
adjudication, the court will review the agency’s factual findings under the 
deferential arbitrary or capricious standard.234 If the factual record is insufficient 
to support the agency’s action, a court may vacate the declaratory order.235 This 
appears to be a fairly rare occurrence, perhaps because most declaratory orders 
are based on uncontested or assumed facts.
IV. AGENCY USE OF DECLARATORY ORDERS
As the discussion so far has shown, the declaratory order is a hybrid of 
legislative rulemaking, adjudication, and guidance.236 This becomes evident 
upon consideration of the five characteristics that scholars have used to describe 
and differentiate the more commonly known policymaking forms available to 
federal agencies. The chart below demonstrates.
                                                                                                                     
230 Cent. Freight Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 899 F.2d 413, 420–21 (5th Cir. 
1990) (citing Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1556–57 (5th Cir. 1989)); see also 
Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 5 F.3d 911, 917 (5th Cir. 
1993) (citing Texas, 866 F.2d at 1556–57).
231 Cent. Freight Lines, 899 F.2d at 423; see also Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. United States, 
812 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
232 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–
83 (2005) (citing Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)); see also Am. Airlines, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 799–801 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting argument that the 
full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, or common law preclusion doctrines required 
a federal agency to give preclusive effect to a previously issued state court decision).
233 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012); Ill. Terminal R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 
671 F.2d 1214, 1216–17 (8th Cir. 1982).
234 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
235 See Hollister Ranch Owners’ Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 759 F.2d 
898, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
236 See supra Part II.B.
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Table 2: Comparing Agency Policymaking Forms
Policymaking 
Form
Process Legal 
Effect
Judicial 
Review
Timing Breadth
Legislative 
Rulemaking
Notice 
and
Comment
Binding Reviewable; 
Deferential
Ex Ante; 
Generally 
Agency 
Initiated
Broad
Adjudication Formal or 
Informal; 
Typically
More 
Closed
Binding Reviewable; 
Deferential
Ex Post; 
Generally 
Agency 
Initiated
Narrow
Guidance Any Nonbinding Sometimes 
Reviewable: 
Less 
Deferential
Ex Ante; 
Agency 
Initiated 
or on 
Request
Broad or 
Narrow
Declaratory 
Order
Formal or 
Informal
Limited 
Binding
Reviewable; 
Deferential
Ex Ante; 
Agency 
Initiated 
or on 
Request 
Generally 
Narrow 
but May 
Be 
Broader
Despite the unique characteristics and apparent usefulness of the declaratory 
order, the historically minimal usage of the device by administrative agencies 
continues today.237 Only five agencies have adopted procedural regulations 
governing declaratory order proceedings: the FCC, the FERC, the FMC, the 
Maritime Administration, and the NLRB.238 Of these, the FERC and the FCC 
appear to have the most robust declaratory practices, while the FMC, the NLRB, 
and the Maritime Administration issue declaratory orders relatively rarely. The 
STB also regularly uses declaratory orders, although it has not adopted 
procedural regulations governing the practice.239 Finally, there are a handful of 
other agencies that have occasionally issued declaratory orders without having 
adopted procedural regulations governing declaratory proceedings.240 Drawing 
                                                                                                                     
237 See supra Part II.D.
238 See FERC Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.1901 (2017); NLRB 
Rules and Regulations, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. § 102.105 (2016); FMC Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, 46 C.F.R. §§ 201.74, 502.93 (2017); FCC Practice and Procedure, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2 
(2016); Powell, Sinners, supra note 25, at 348 n.37 (discussing the NLRB).
239 See, e.g., Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Town of Ayer, 330 F.3d 12, 14 n.2 (1st Cir. 2003). 
240 See, e.g., FDA, Final Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 34,650, 34,656 (June 17, 2015) (“This final determination is a 5 U.S.C. 554(e) 
declaratory order regarding the status of [Partially Hydrogenated Oils].”); Sec. & Exch. 
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on this experience, this Part considers how agencies can best use declaratory 
orders to improve their adjudicative and regulatory programs. 
A. Defining the Scope of Declaratory Practice
How should agencies use declaratory orders—in what circumstances and to 
address what kinds of issues? The appropriate use of the declaratory order, as 
articulated in the text of the APA and fleshed out through judicial precedent, 
agency experience, and scholarly evaluation, provides a natural starting point. 
It provides the foundational principle that an agency should use a declaratory 
order when it is necessary to provide binding, noncoercive guidance to regulated 
parties in order to terminate an actual or emerging controversy or to resolve 
uncertainty in the application of existing legal requirements. What this general 
principle will mean to an individual agency depends on that agency’s unique 
mission and context, including its statutory framework, the particular needs of 
its adjudicative or regulatory regime, and the culture of the industry it regulates 
or the community it serves. At the most basic level, the agency’s substantive 
statutory authority will necessarily define the range of issues that it may address 
through a declaratory order.241 The case law demonstrates, however, that there 
is a wide variety of purposes for which an agency may properly use a declaratory 
order, including to: (1) interpret the agency’s governing statute or own 
regulations; (2) define terms of art; (3) clarify whether a matter falls within 
federal regulatory authority; or (4) address questions of preemption.242 The 
device also offers a way for an agency to provide regulated parties with advance 
notice of how the agency will apply existing regulations to new or novel 
                                                                                                                     
Comm’n, Special Opportunities Fund, Inc., Notice of Application, 78 Fed. Reg. 49,555, 
49,555 (Aug. 8, 2013) (“Absent a request for a hearing that is granted by the [Securities and 
Exchange] Commission, the Commission intends to issue an order under Section 554(e) of 
the APA declaring that applicant’s proxy voting procedure does not satisfy Section 
12(d)(1)(F) of the Act.”). 
241 See, e.g., Ill. Terminal R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 671 F.2d 1214, 1216 
(8th Cir. 1982) (“Of course, § 554(e) does not allow an agency to issue a declaratory order 
on any subject matter; there must be some underlying authority.”); accord 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) 
(2012) (“A sanction may not be imposed or a substantive rule or order issued except within 
jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.”).
242 See Ill. Terminal R.R., 671 F.2d at 1216; N.Y State Comm’n on Cable Television v. 
FCC, 669 F.2d 58, 66 (2d Cir. 1982); N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787, 794 (4th 
Cir. 1976); Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 421 F.2d 17, 20 (6th Cir. 1970). 
In Recommendation 2010-1, Agency Procedures for Considering Preemption of State Law,
the Administrative Conference urged agencies to consider procedural reforms designed to 
improve agency compliance with Executive Order 13132, which requires consultation with 
state and local governments in potentially preemptive rulemakings. See 76 Fed. Reg. 81, 81
(Jan. 3, 2011). Subject to the limitations imposed by the ex parte rules that apply in 
administrative adjudications, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012), this consultation may be easier in a 
declaratory order proceeding, because the narrow and known factual context makes clear the 
identity of any affected state or local authorities or interests.
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circumstances.243 Even in the absence of novelty, an agency can provide 
targeted guidance to regulated parties by declaring how existing regulatory 
requirements apply to a defined factual context.244
Looking beyond the agencies’ independent needs, the declaratory order is 
also an excellent device for agencies to use to assist state or federal courts by 
answering questions that are within an agency’s special competence but arise in 
litigation in which the agency is not a party.245 In some cases, parties may seek 
a declaratory order from an administrative agency at a court’s express direction 
or referral.246 In other cases, parties may ask an agency to issue a declaratory 
order in contemplation of or during the course of litigation, but without being 
so directed by a court.247 Courts have perceived no legal impediment to such 
parallel administrative proceedings248 and may even stay a proceeding pending 
the agency’s decision.249 Regardless of how an issue is raised before the agency, 
its opinion may be very important to the litigation, even if it is not sufficient to 
determine the outcome before the courts.250 If an agency finds that the meaning 
of its governing statute, regulations, or other legal documents (such as permits 
or licenses) is commonly at issue in litigation to which it is not a party, the 
agency should consider creating a declaratory order procedure through which 
litigants can seek the agency’s considered views. By doing so explicitly by 
regulation or through written guidance, the agency can make clear to its 
regulated industry the circumstances in which it will look favorably upon such 
petitions for declaratory order.
An agency can and should use its regulations to communicate and enforce 
its preferred uses of declaratory orders. This may be especially effective if the 
                                                                                                                     
243 See Aviators for Safe and Fairer Regulation, Inc. v. U.S. Fed. Aviation Admin., 221 
F.3d 222, 231 (1st Cir. 2000).
244 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 733–34 (1978).
245 See supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text.
246 See Richman Bros. Records, Inc. v. FCC, 124 F.3d 1302, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see 
also Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Town of Ayer, 330 F.3d 12, 15–17 (1st Cir. 2003). By statute, 
Congress has expressly allowed for the courts to refer questions or issues to certain agencies, 
see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1336(b) (2012) (governing judicial referral to the STB), but because 
such referral may have “significant procedural consequences, a district court’s stay of an 
action to allow a parallel [agency] action to proceed will not be treated as a referral . . . unless 
the district court clearly implies or explicitly states that it is referring the case to the” agency. 
W. Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Am. Indus., Inc., 893 F.2d 229, 231 (9th Cir. 1990).
247 See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 795 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(“At the urging of several of the parties, and while both the federal and state actions were 
pending, DOT initiated the interpretative proceeding that is the subject of this petition for 
review.”); Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Fed. Power. Comm’n, 421 F.2d 17, 19 (6th Cir. 1970) 
(“On November 15, 1967, after the initiation of the action in the District Court, Phillips filed 
a petition with the Commission for a declaratory order.”).
248 See Ashland Oil, 421 F.2d at 20–21.
249 See, e.g., E.W. Resort Transp., LLC v. Sopkin, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1267 (D. Colo. 
2005) (staying litigation pending STB’s conclusion of declaratory proceeding on issue within 
agency’s primary jurisdiction).
250 See City of Chi. v. FCC, 199 F.3d 424, 428–29 (7th Cir. 1999).
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agency’s declaratory practice is focused on a petition-initiated process.251 In its 
regulations, the agency can allow or even require regulated parties to request a 
declaratory order as a means of obtaining particular types of guidance from the 
agency.252 This guidance need not be confined to the agency’s procedural 
regulation(s), but can rather be integrated into the appropriate provisions of the 
agency’s substantive regulations. This approach helps regulated parties 
understand how the agency prefers to use declaratory orders, and may thereby 
lend some order to the petitioning practice before the agency.253
The FERC is a good example of an agency that has a robust declaratory 
practice that is well defined and controlled by regulation and written policy. In 
the FERC’s view, declaratory orders are generally not an appropriate vehicle for 
broad pronouncements on legal or policy issues, but are more typically used to 
address novel issues or provide needed regulatory certainty with respect to 
narrow legal questions on defined facts.254 From this perspective, a declaratory 
proceeding offers an early and more efficient route for regulated parties to either 
(1) obtain certainty before they invest significant resources in a project; and/or 
(2) pursue the potentially more expensive and involved route of a tariff filing or 
complaint before the agency. 
The FERC clearly communicates these broad principles and agency 
preferences to its regulated industry in writing. For example, on the FERC’s
website, the agency defines a “Petition For Declaratory Order” as:
[A] petition requesting the issuance of an order or ruling on jurisdictional issues 
where uncertainty, ambiguity, or controversy exists. The petition may seek an 
interpretation of a party’s rights or obligations under contracts, statutes, rules, 
regulations, or orders. Pleadings filed in the form of petitions for declaratory 
orders which seek more than a mere interpretive ruling (particularly those 
                                                                                                                     
251 As a purely descriptive matter, most of the agencies included in this study issue most 
if not all of their declaratory orders in response to petitions and not sua sponte. See supra
Part III.B.
252 See, e.g., FERC Certain Sales and Transportation of Natural Gas under the Natural 
Gas Policy Act of 1978 and Related Authorities, 18 C.F.R. § 284.502 (2017) (providing that 
certain FERC applicants “must file a request for declaratory order” (emphasis added)); FCC 
Commercial Mobile Services, 47 C.F.R. § 20.9(a)(14)(ii) (2016) (“Any interested party may 
seek to overcome the presumption that a particular mobile radio service is a private mobile 
radio service by filing a petition for declaratory ruling challenging a mobile service 
provider’s regulatory treatment as a private mobile radio service.”).
253 This effort can be supported further if the agency provides guidance in its regulations 
regarding how a petition should be filed and what information it should contain in order to 
ensure that the agency has all the information it needs to process the petition efficiently. 
These matters are addressed in the discussion of agency procedures in Part IV.B. 
254 See Interpretative Order Modifying No-Action Letter Process and Reviewing Other 
Mechanisms for Obtaining Guidance, 123 FERC ¶ 61,157, at 8–9 (2008) (No. PL08-2-000),
http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2008/051508/M-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5DTB-GSJ5].
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involving alleged rate schedule violations) are treated, instead, as formal 
complaints.255
Building on this, the FERC’s regulations provide essential detail by 
specifically identifying the declaratory order as an appropriate procedural 
vehicle to:
? Permit “[a] non-public utility [to] submit an open access transmission 
tariff and a request for declaratory order that its voluntary transmission 
tariff meets the requirements” of Commission rulemaking proceedings 
promulgating and amending the pro forma tariff.256
? Evaluate proposals to create or participate in Regional Transmission 
Organizations.257
? Consider “[a] public utility’s request for one or more incentive-based 
rate treatments” before that utility files for such treatments under § 205 
of the Federal Power Act.258
? Resolve questions “concerning the Commission’s jurisdiction over a 
hydropower project under the Federal Power Act.”259
? Consider requests for waiver of or exemption from certain regulatory 
requirements,260 or to evaluate the effect of a material change in facts 
on a previously granted waiver or exemption.261
? Receive declarations of intent under § 23(b) of the Federal Power 
Act.262
In addition, the FERC’s regulations in some cases facilitate the use of 
declaratory orders to streamline subsequent, related proceedings by calling for 
                                                                                                                     
255 Application/Petition Definitions, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N,
https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/help/Definitions/Sub_Definitions/Submittal/Applicaiton_Pe
tition_Definitions.htm [https://perma.cc/T9QA-V7F5]. 
256 FERC Filing of Rate Schedules & Tariffs, 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(e)(1). “Any submittal 
and request for declaratory order submitted by a non-public utility will be provided an NJ 
(non-jurisdictional) docket designation.” Id. § 35.28(e)(i).
257 See id. § 35.34(d)(3).
258 Id. § 35.35(d).
259 FERC The Commission, 18 C.F.R. § 375.308(c). More specifically, this provision 
delegates authority to the Director of the Office of Energy Projects (or the Director’s
designee) to “[t]ake appropriate action” on such petitions. Id.
260 See FERC Regulations Under Sections 201 and 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978 with Regard to Small Power Production and Cogeneration, 18 C.F.R.
§ 292.203(d)(2); FERC Books and Records 18 C.F.R. §§ 366.3(d), 366.4(b)(3), (c)(2), 
366.5(b)–(c), 366.7(b). Other agencies, such as the FMC, do not use declaratory orders for 
this purpose, but instead have a separate process especially designed for considering requests 
for regulatory exemptions. See FMC Rules of Practice and Procedure, 46 C.F.R. § 502.92 
(2017).
261 See FERC Books and Records,18 C.F.R. §§ 366.4(d)(1)(i), (d)(2)(ii), 366.7(c).
262 See FERC Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.207(b).
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certain such orders to affect the applicable burden of proof.263 By explicitly 
integrating the declaratory device into its regulatory regime, the FERC has 
cultivated a well-defined, manageable declaratory practice that appears to 
benefit both the agency and the regulated industry.264
The FCC is another agency that has defined by regulation the purposes for 
which it uses declaratory proceedings. For example, the FCC’s regulations 
structure the International Bureau’s use of declaratory rulings to approve foreign 
ownership in common carriers under section 310 of the Communications Act of 
1934.265 The regulations also specify in detail the required contents of petitions 
filed for this purpose266 and identify routine terms and conditions to which the 
resulting rulings are subject.267 The International Bureau also uses declaratory 
rulings to respond to requests for authorization to provide service in the U.S. 
using non-U.S. licensed satellites,268 while the Consumer and Governmental 
Affairs Bureau uses them to evaluate the validity of various restrictions on the 
reception of certain signals or services.269 The FCC’s regulations thus help to 
shape the agency’s declaratory practice by giving clear advice to the regulated 
industry regarding the circumstances in which the agency views a petition for 
declaratory ruling as the appropriate procedural vehicle. 
An agency may also use its regulations or other written procedures and 
policies to make clear to its regulated industry the limits that it will impose on 
                                                                                                                     
263 The FERC’s rules provide when a nonpublic utility successfully secures a declaratory 
order finding its open access transmission tariff acceptable under the Commission’s rules, a 
later “applicant in a Federal Power Act (FPA) section 211 or 211A proceeding against the 
non-public utility shall have the burden of proof to show why service under the open access 
transmission tariff is not sufficient and why a section 211 or 211A order should be granted.”
FERC Filing of Rate Schedules & Tariffs, 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(e)(ii).
264 A quick survey of industry newsletters suggests that the FERC’s declaratory orders 
are effective in communicating the agency’s policy positions and providing guidance to 
regulated parties. See, e.g., 2014-A Big Year for FERC Orders Addressing LNG Jurisdiction,
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, http://www.troutman.com/files/Uploads/Documents/
LNG%20FERC%20Rulings.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3VX-V9A9]; James F. Bowe, Jr., FERC 
Decision Rejects Oil Pipeline’s Petition for Declaratory Order Approving Contract Rates, 
Special Prorationing Methodologies and Priority Access to Excess Capacity, KING &
SPALDING ENERGY NEWSLETTER (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.kslaw.com/library/newsletters/
EnergyNewsletter/2014/April/article5.html [https://perma.cc/95TL-SBCU]. 
265 See FCC Practice & Procedure Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 1.990(a)(1)–(2) (2016).
266 See id. § 1.991.
267 See id. § 1.994.
268 See FCC Satellite Communications, 47 C.F.R. § 25.137.
269 See FCC Practice and Procedure, 47 C.F.R. § 1.4000(e). Other FCC regulations 
specify the declaratory ruling as the appropriate procedural vehicle for addressing other, 
specific kinds of issues. E.g., FCC Commercial Mobile Services, 47 C.F.R. § 20.9(a)(14)(ii) 
(“Any interested party may seek to overcome the presumption that a particular mobile radio 
service is a private mobile radio service by filing a petition for declaratory ruling challenging 
a mobile service provider’s regulatory treatment as a private mobile radio service.”); 
Interconnection, 47 C.F.R. § 51.232(b) (“Any party seeking designation of a technology as
a known disturber should file a petition for declaratory ruling with the Commission seeking 
such designation, pursuant to § 1.2 of this chapter.”).
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its declaratory practice. The FERC accomplishes this through its written 
guidance.270 The FMC provides another good example. Its regulations establish 
declaratory order procedures, but state explicitly that those procedures “must be 
invoked solely for the purpose of obtaining declaratory rulings which will allow 
persons to act without peril upon their own view.”271 In its dispositions of 
petitions for declaratory order, the FMC has adhered to and elaborated upon this 
statement of principle.272 The FMC has explained that, in its view, “petitions for 
declaratory order, by their very nature concern potential violations of law. In 
fact . . . a potential legal peril must be demonstrated before the Commission 
will, under its rules, even entertain a petition for declaratory order.”273
Additionally, in practice, the FMC does not use declaratory orders to address 
matters that involve contested facts274 or will be more appropriately resolved 
through other kinds of proceedings.275 This latter limitation is evident in the 
FMC’s regulations, which provide that “[c]ontroversies involving an allegation 
of violation by another person of statutes administered by the Commission, for 
which coercive rulings such as payment of reparation or cease and desist orders 
are sought, are not proper subjects of petitions” for declaratory order.276 Perhaps 
as a consequence of these clearly articulated policies, the FMC receives 
                                                                                                                     
270 See Interpretative Order Modifying No-Action Letter Process and Reviewing Other 
Mechanisms for Obtaining Guidance, 123 FERC ¶ 61,157, at 8–9 (2008), http://www.ferc.
gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2008/051508/M-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DTB-GSJ5].
271 FMC Rules of Practice and Procedure, 46 C.F.R. § 502.93(b) (2017).
272 See, e.g., Petition of Olympus Growth Fund III, L.P. for Declaratory Order, 
Rulemaking or Other Relief, 31 S.R.R. 718, 723 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n. 2009) (explaining that 
a declaratory order “is . . . ‘intended to provide guidance to persons who have not yet acted 
and who desire a legal ruling on a proposed, future course of action’” (quoting Petition of 
Evergreen Marine Corp. (Taiwan), Ltd. for Declaratory Order, 26 S.R.R. 605, 607 (Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n 1992))).
273 Olympus Growth Fund, 31 S.R.R. at 723 (quoting Indep. Action on Freight 
Forwarder Comp., 23 S.R.R. 390, 395 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n 1985)).
274 See, e.g., Comp. of Indep. Ocean Freight Forwarders, 19 S.R.R. 1741, 1742 (F.M.C. 
1980) (“For a declaratory judgment to issue, there must be a dispute which ‘calls, not for an 
advisory opinion upon a hypothetical basis, but for an adjudication of present right upon 
established facts.’” (quoting Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172 (1977) (per curiam))). 
There is some tension between this aspect of the FMC’s practice and the provision of its 
procedural regulations suggesting the possibility of permitting “discovery or evidentiary 
hearing” on a petition. See FMC Rules of Practice and Procedure, 46 C.F.R. § 502.93(c), (e). 
275 See, e.g., Consolo v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 7 F.M.C. 635, 640 (1963)
(explaining that an agency need not issue a declaratory order where it appears the questions 
involved may be determined in a pending administrative or judicial proceeding, or where 
there is available some other statutory proceeding that will be more appropriate or effective
under the circumstances), rev’d sub nom. Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 619–
20 (1966); see also AG’S MANUAL, supra note 24, at 60 (”[A]n agency need not issue 
[declaratory] orders where it appears that the questions involved will be determined in a 
pending administrative or judicial proceeding, or where there is available some other 
statutory proceeding which will be more appropriate or effective under the circumstances.”).
276 FMC Rules of Practice and Procedure, 46 C.F.R. § 502.93(b).
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relatively few petitions for declaratory order, and it denies many of the petitions 
that it does receive.277
B. Agency Decisions Analogous to Declaratory Orders
Some consideration of agency decisions that appear to be analogous to 
declaratory orders or rulings may help to elucidate the circumstances in which 
agencies may be able to make more productive use of the declaratory device.278
The somewhat recent judicial approval of the issuance of declaratory orders 
through informal adjudicative processes also raises the possibility that some 
agencies may already be issuing decisions that are, in essence, declaratory 
orders, but which are called by some other name.279 One example is the 
“declaratory ruling” used by the FCC.280 For many years, there was substantial 
disagreement over whether these rulings were properly considered to be 
“declaratory orders.”281 The courts’ acceptance of them as such has, however, 
terminated that controversy, allowing other agencies and scholars to draw from 
the FCC’s declaratory practice in understanding the possibilities and limitations 
of declaratory orders in administrative adjudication. The FCC’s experience also 
highlights the need for agencies to pay careful attention to determining and 
observing minimum procedural requirements when issuing declaratory orders 
through informal adjudication. In City of Arlington, the Fifth Circuit clearly 
signaled that it would have invalidated the FCC’s declaratory order if the agency 
had not used basic notice-and-comment procedures.282
A possibly analogous device may be found among the various forms of 
guidance that the IRS offers to taxpayers.283 The IRS has a sophisticated and 
somewhat complex system of guidance that uses a number of different, 
complementary vehicles to explain to taxpayers how the agency interprets and 
applies the United States tax code.284 A complete description and analysis of 
this system is well beyond the scope of this study, but it may be valuable to 
                                                                                                                     
277 In the petitioning context, a “denial” is an agency decision not to institute a 
declaratory proceeding or issue a declaratory order. In contrast, an agency “grants” (in whole 
or in part) a petition when it responds by issuing a declaratory order, even if the content or 
conclusion of the order is different from that which the petitioner requested.
278 See Comment, supra note 138, at 261; see also Administrative Conference of the 
United States, Recommendation 70-2, SEC No-Action Letters Under Section 4 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (June 2–3, 1970), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/70-
2-ss.no-FR.pdf. [https://perma.cc/Q8RC-JKVG].
279 See supra notes 67, 139 and accompanying text.
280 FCC Practice and Procedure, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2016).
281 See supra notes 67, 139 and accompanying text.
282 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 243–44 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct.
1863 (2013).
283 See generally Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, 
Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 323 
(2008) (describing the various forms of guidance provided by the IRS to taxpayers).
284 Id. at 324–25.
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consider three of the primary guidance vehicles used by the agency: regulations, 
revenue rulings, and letter rulings.285 The most formal of these are regulations, 
which may be legislative or interpretative, but are in either event legally binding 
statements of agency policy and legal interpretation that taxpayers may rely 
upon.286 At the other end of the spectrum is the private letter ruling, the purpose 
of which is “to provide taxpayers with definite and reliable determinations as to 
the tax treatment of future transactions.”287 A “letter ruling” is defined as “a
written statement issued to a taxpayer by an Associate Chief Counsel Office of 
the Office of Chief Counsel or by the Tax Exempt and Government Entities 
Division that interprets and applies the tax laws to a specific set of facts”
generally involving “transactions that have not been consummated.”288 A letter 
ruling is not binding on the taxpayer, but it is generally reliable because the 
retroactive effect of any revocation is strictly limited.289 By statute, letter rulings 
must be publicly available (with personally identifying information redacted),
but generally have no precedential value.290 Finally, revenue rulings are 
“official interpretations by the Service, which are prepared in the Associate 
Chief Counsel Offices and published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin” that 
“represent the conclusions of the Service on the application of the law to the 
pivotal facts stated in the revenue ruling.”291 The facts used in revenue rulings 
are often drawn from letter rulings, but are stated in a generalized way. Although 
revenue rulings “do not have the force and effect of” regulations, those 
published “may be used as precedents.”292 In this respect, “the revenue ruling 
program is centered upon uniformity of interpretation, rather than on the 
problem of the individual taxpayer.”293
                                                                                                                     
285 Id. at 326, 330, 352.
286 See id. at 326–30.
287 Id. at 346. Although it is not entirely clear, the letter ruling program may be what the 
General Counsel of the Treasury Department proposed to create in 1938. See generally
Oliphant, supra note 64. Another device the IRS uses to provide certainty to taxpayers is the 
closing agreement, which is conceived as more in the nature of a settlement, which is 
generally reached after a transaction has been consummated and problems have been 
identified during examination. See Korb, supra note 283, at 349–50; see also 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7121 (2012).
288 Korb, supra note 283, at 342–43.
289 Id. at 348.
290 See 26 U.S.C. § 6110(h)(1), (k)(3); Korb, supra note 283, at 347–48. A letter ruling 
will have precedential effect only if the Secretary so provides by regulation, id., but “[t]he 
only regulations that come close to allowing reliance are the penalty regulations under 
section 6662.” Id. at 348. In 1976, out of concern that private letter rulings were creating a 
body of secret law not available to all taxpayers, Congress required the IRS to make the 
rulings available to the public. See id. at 347; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6110(h)(1). This history 
is fascinating in its own right.
291 Korb, supra note 283, at 330.
292 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., BULL. NO. 2015-1, INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN
(2015), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb15-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E82-KZVA].
293 Korb, supra note 283, at 331.
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Although letter rulings and revenue rulings each share many of the 
characteristics of declaratory orders, neither is wholly analogous. For its part, 
the letter ruling is like a declaratory order in that it is typically issued in response 
to an individual request for guidance from a taxpayer, provides a generally 
reliable sense of how the agency will apply the law to proffered facts, serves the 
purpose of addressing the taxpayer’s uncertainty, and is made publicly 
available.294 But it is not legally binding, has no precedential effect, and is not
subject to judicial review.295 The revenue ruling is more closely analogous to a 
declaratory order—it is more formal, may generate greater certainty, and has 
precedential effect.296 But it is based on facts that are generalized, it binds no 
individual taxpayer, and although “courts will often hold the Service to the 
position expressed in the revenue ruling,” they do not consistently defer to 
them.297
Another device that appears to be even more similar to a declaratory order 
is the “advisory opinion” that § 205 of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) authorizes the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), in consultation with the Department of Justice, to 
issue.298 Although the nomenclature used to describe this device suggests it is 
merely a form of nonbinding guidance, closer inspection reveals it to be more. 
The HHS advisory opinion power is used to provide healthcare providers with 
case-specific exceptions to the antikickback laws that prevent fraud and 
corruption in federal healthcare entitlement programs.299 Generally speaking, 
agency decisions that provide exceptions or safe harbors to otherwise applicable 
regulatory requirements are viewed as necessarily legislative (i.e., legally 
binding) rules.300 In keeping with this general principle, HIPAA expressly 
provides that an HHS advisory opinion on antikickback liability “shall be 
binding as to the Secretary and the party or parties requesting the opinion.”301
This binding effect, although limited, gives healthcare providers the certainty 
necessary to move forward with innovative business arrangements that can 
benefit the public by reducing costs and improving access to healthcare.302 The 
                                                                                                                     
294 See id. at 342–47.
295 Id. at 348.
296 See id. at 335–36.
297 Id. at 336.
298 See 42 U.S.C. § 1302a-7d(b) (2012); Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Office of 
Inspector General, Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse, Issuance of 
Advisory Opinions by the OIG, 63 Fed. Reg. 38,311, 38,313 (July 16, 1998) (codified at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 1008 (2016)). See generally Christopher J. Climo, Note, A Laboratory of 
Regulation: The Untapped Potential of the HHS Advisory Opinion Power, 68 VAND. L. REV.
1761 (2015) (examining HHS’s statutory power to grant “advisory opinions”).
299 See Climo, supra note 298, at 1763. 
300 See Emily S. Bremer, American and European Perspectives on Private Standards in 
Public Law, 91 TUL. L. REV. 325, 365 & n.182 (2016).
301 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(4)(A).
302 See Climo, supra note 298, at 1766. 
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HHS advisory opinion thus has the core characteristics of a declaratory order 
and offers the same benefits.303
C. Expanding the Use of Declaratory Orders
The declaratory order is a unique procedural device that offers valuable 
benefits to both agencies and regulated parties. Although agencies may be 
understandably reluctant to legally bind themselves, doing so may in some 
instances be the only way to achieve the level of clarity and certainty that is 
necessary for a program to run smoothly and effectively. The adjudicatory 
nature of the declaratory order offers a valuable compromise here: it allows the
agency to bind itself and regulated parties, but that binding effect is limited by 
the facts stated in the order, and the agency is not prevented from changing its 
legal conclusion or policy in a subsequent order. By providing definitive 
guidance through a document of easily ascertainable legal effect, declaratory 
orders may reduce or eliminate litigation.304 By using declaratory orders to 
address narrow questions raised by specific and uncontested facts, an agency 
can precisely define the legal issues it addresses and reserve related issues for 
future resolution, thereby facilitating an incremental approach to the provision 
of regulatory guidance. The resulting body of agency precedent will not only be 
useful to regulated and other interested parties, but may also prove invaluable 
to the agency when it later decides to conduct a rulemaking or other proceeding 
for formulating policy on a broader scale. Other uses may be possible as well. 
For example, an agency that conducts mass adjudication could use the 
declaratory order to promote uniformity by giving its own adjudicators practical 
and detailed guidance regarding the proper application of the law to commonly 
encountered factual circumstances.305
Three developments may encourage agencies to overcome their traditional 
reluctance to use declaratory orders. First, it is now reasonably clear that 
agencies may issue declaratory orders in informal adjudication.306 This 
development expands the availability of the device and also reduces the cost and 
procedural burden of using declaratory orders. Second, courts today are more 
willing to review guidance documents and to question an agency’s
characterization of its action as nonbinding.307 The legal concepts underlying 
this development are difficult and contested, and the relevant judicial precedent 
is inconsistent and often unclear. Agencies may be able to avoid some of the 
attendant litigation risk by using declaratory orders—a binding, but targeted 
form of guidance—in lieu of other forms of nonbinding, legislative guidance. 
                                                                                                                     
303 See id.
304 Cf. Korb, supra note 283, at 331.
305 To the author’s knowledge, no agency currently uses declaratory orders in this 
manner. But the method appears to be wholly consistent with the law governing the 
appropriate confines of administrative declarations. 
306 Lubbers & Morant, supra note 16, at 1112–13.
307 See supra Part II.D.
1214 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:5
Finally, new programs and new challenges facing old programs may create 
opportunities to beneficially expand the use of declaratory orders. For example, 
and as previously suggested, the device may be particularly well suited for
streamlining overwhelmed adjudicatory programs by providing definitive 
guidance on the resolution of common issues. 
In light of the unique advantages of declaratory orders and these recent 
developments, agencies should use declaratory orders more frequently. It may 
be particularly appropriate for an agency to use a declaratory order when 
regulated parties request or otherwise appear to require concrete guidance as to 
how the agency would apply existing regulatory requirements to proposed or 
contemplated activities or to emerging or concrete disputes among regulated 
parties or between a regulated party and state or local government. Ordinarily, 
the facts regarding these activities should be susceptible of accurate description, 
uncontested, and unlikely to change.308 Beyond these most basic considerations, 
however, agencies should experiment with innovative uses of declaratory orders 
to improve regulatory programs by providing binding and reliable guidance.
V. CONCLUSION
The declaratory order is an overlooked and valuable tool that agencies 
historically have underused. A product of adjudication, this procedural device 
allows an agency to dispel uncertainty and to develop administrative policy 
incrementally through targeted, legally binding, noncoercive guidance to 
regulated parties. It thus offers a unique combination of the characteristics of 
the more widely known and commonly used policymaking forms of rulemaking, 
adjudication, and guidance.
The historical underuse of the device may be attributed to a variety of 
factors, among which two are key. First, for many decades after the APA’s
passage, the prevailing view was that a declaratory order could be used to 
address only those relatively few matters that are subject by statute to formal 
adjudication.309 This view sharply limited the usefulness of the device—but the 
courts have more recently discarded it.310 Second, agencies have consistently 
exhibited a preference for informal, nonbinding forms of guidance that are more 
shielded from judicial review than are declaratory orders.311 In recent decades, 
                                                                                                                     
308 See, e.g., CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:17, at 
40 (3d ed. 2010) (“Ordinarily declaratory orders should be issued only where critical facts 
are clear and cannot be altered by subsequent events.”); AG’S MANUAL, supra note 24, at 60 
(stating that declaratory orders should “be employed only in situations where the critical 
facts can be explicitly stated, without possibility that subsequent events will alter them”);
Gellhorn, supra note 89, at 157 (arguing that “declaratory rulings should be reserved for 
cases which reflect a real need for administrative guidance” and “are appropriate only when 
the fact situations to which they relate can be described accurately and unequivocally”).
309 See supra Part II.C.
310 See supra notes 112–17, 159 and accompanying text.
311 See supra Part II.D.
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however, courts have demonstrated a greater willingness to scrutinize an 
agency’s characterization of a document as nonbinding and to review informal 
guidance.312 This development may have reduced the declaratory order’s
apparent comparative disadvantage. 
In light of these developments, it appears that the time is ripe for agencies 
to integrate the declaratory order more fully into their procedural arsenal. The 
experiences of the relatively few agencies that have a robust declaratory 
practices suggests that, when used appropriately, the declaratory order can 
improve the administration of both regulatory and adjudicatory programs.313 It 
can allow an agency to save significant resources by staying abreast of emerging 
developments, addressing issues before they become problems, and 
preemptively adjudicating matters that might otherwise have to be resolved 
through more costly enforcement mechanisms. Building on previous 
experience, agencies should not hesitate to identify innovative new ways to use 
declaratory orders. An agency that has been charged with administering a new 
program, or which faces new challenges in an existing program, may be 
particularly well positioned to innovate.
                                                                                                                     
312 See supra notes 112–17, 159 and accompanying text.
313 See supra Part IV.A.

